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Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Divided Court
Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in
Medtronic Ina v. Lohr
QUESTION: Isn't it odd, don't you think, that with an
agency that is charged with regulating food, drugs, medical
devices, that Congress would create this regime that ousts
State tort remedies for medical devices but not for drugs, not
for food, not for cosmetics? Why would Congress do that?
MR. MILLER: That, of course, is a decision for Congress
to make, and it did make it. It is quite conceivable that the
sociology of the device industry and the critical character of
the device industry as perceived in the seventies, the need for
innovation, the need for availability, motivated that Congress
to do this.
Keep in mind, [with] device technology in 1957, Mrs. Lohr
would be dead. In 1977, her pacing would simply be metro-
nome pacing.'
State products liability law has traditionally been a means of en-
suring that injured consumers will not have to shoulder the costs of
their injuries.2 Additionally, the prospect of lawsuits and large dam-
age awards provides an incentive for manufacturers to design and sell
safe products. In recent years, this tort products liability system has
1. Transcript of Oral Arg., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-
754 and 95-886), available in 1996 WL 207143, at *26. Professor Arthur Miller of Har-
vard Law School argued on behalf of Medtronic, Inc. before the United States Supreme
Court. See id. at *1.
2. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
("The purpose of [strict liability for defective products] is to insure that the costs of inju-
ries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."); GEORGE A. PETERS, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY 1 (1971) ("In the
area of product liability, the courts are saying that someone has to pay for the conse-
quences of design defects, manufacturing errors, inspection oversights, failure to properly
test, and failure to warn of hazards that might not be obvious to the consumer.");
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 641-43 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussing theoretical underpinnings of products liability).
3. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("It is to the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public."); Mary L. Lyndon,
Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 176 (1995) ("[Tjort law's signals [to
manufacturers] contain necessary basic messages that are not delivered through any other
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been supplemented-or, for certain types of products, replaced alto-
gether 4-by direct federal regulation.5
Today, federal statutes and regulations govern the manufacture
and sale of food products and drugs,6 cigarettes,7 agricultural chemi-
cals,8 and consumer products.9 In contrast to products liability
actions, these statutes usually serve solely preventative goals, and do
not provide compensation for injured consumers.' Often, these
product safety statutes have an additional purpose: to strike a regula-
tory balance that encourages manufacturers to fully develop and
exploit new technologies, while simultaneously ensuring some mini-
mum safety testing." To accomplish this balance, Congress must
medium. An important function of the law is to guide early evolution of technologies
4. See infra note 13 (describing various federal statutes which preempt state tort
actions as part of a federal regulatory scheme).
5. See generally JAMES T. O'REILLY, PRODUCr DEFECTS AND HAZARDS:
LITIGATION AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2-4 (1987) (discussing the interplay be-
tween tort common law and federal regulation of products); Lyndon, supra note 3, at 138-
39 (explaining theory that regulation is superior to tort liability from a public policy
standpoint).
6. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994), amended
by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.
7. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
8. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489.
9. See Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-78 (1994); Consumer
Product Safety Act, id §§ 2051-84 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2251 (1996) ("[T]here is no
explicit private cause of action against manufacturers contained in the [Medical Device
Amendments of the Food and Drug Act], and no suggestion that the Act created an im-
plied private right of action .... ).
11. See, e.g., 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 1.01, at 1-
2 (2d ed. 1995) ("The thrust of the [Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] has been to
balance consumer protection and safety considerations against avoidance of unnecessary
costs and preservation of the procedural rights of the industries under regulation."). Ex-
cessive regulation could hamper innovations that ultimately benefit the public. See H.R.
REP. No. 94-853, at 10 (1976) ("[E]xcessive or ill-conceived Federal device regulation
would stifle progress in this field."); 1 O'REILLY, supra, § 18.01, at 18-7 ("[C]ontinued
stimulus to innovation was deemed desirable by all parties at the time the [Medical De-
vice Amendments were] adopted."); Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical
Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1987) ("[I]n cases of medical innovation ...
both risks and rewards frequently are great."). The need to avoid regulatory excesses is
especially compelling with respect to the introduction of new medical devices because of
the prospect of life-saving advances. See 1 O'REILLY, supra, § 18.01, at 18-7 ("[T]he
amount of regulation should be calibrated to each device's risks and benefits."). See gen-
erally S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1083
(expressing desire that regulation "permit new or improved devices to be marketed with-
out delay so that the public may have such beneficial devices available to them as soon as
possible").
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assure manufacturers that the regulations governing them will be uni-
form and consistent. 2 As a means to this end, many product safety
statutes contain preemption language providing, in one way or an-
other, that states shall not make or enforce requirements that are
inconsistent with requirements under the federal statute. 3
However, even when Congress has expressly provided that a
statute preempts additional state requirements, it is often unclear
how extensively Congress intended to preempt state law.1 4 It is well-
settled that such a preemption clause precludes state legislatures and
regulatory agencies from enacting statutes or regulations which im-
pose additional or different requirements.15 The more problematic
question is whether Congress intended to preempt state tort actions,
which require manufacturers either to comply with common-law
standards or to face monetary liability for their failure to do so.6 If
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 4 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350,
2352 (characterizing preemption clause in 1965 cigarette labeling statute as precluding "a
multiplicity of State and local regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages,"
which would lead to "chaotic marketing conditions and consumer confusion").
13. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994) ("Such State shall not impose or continue in
effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those
required under this subchapter."); 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) ("No requirement or prohi-
bition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in confor-
mity with the provisions of this chapter."); id. § 2075(a) ("Whenever a consumer product
safety standard under this chapter is in effect and applies to a risk of injury associated
with a consumer product, no State ... shall have any authority either to establish or to
continue in effect any provision of a safety standard or regulation .... "); 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a) (1994) ("[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement .... ).
14. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995). In Freightliner, the
Court ruled that design defect claims against a tractor-trailer manufacturer over its failure
to install an anti-lock braking system were not preempted by the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Act of 1966. See id. at 1485. The Court based its holding on the fact that
no federal requirement existed that would conflict with a common law standard requiring
anti-lock brakes. See id. at 1488.
15. See Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Florida
statutes governing dispensation of hearing aids constituted "any requirement" within the
meaning of the preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a) (1994), although due to other considerations the regulations were not pre-
empted); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1233 (Kan. 1987) (mentioning that
state statutes, such as the Kansas Food Drug & Cosmetic Act, would be preempted if they
created substantive requirements other than labeling or branding rules); N.J. Guild of
Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 812 (N.J. 1978) (holding that New Jersey
regulations on hearing aids were preempted by federal regulations under the Medical
Device Amendments).
16. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 6 ("[F]oreseeable hazards must be predicted and
controlled or the dollar liability for defective products may challenge the economic health
and well being of the company ... ."); cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to
[Vol. 751442
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the word "requirement" encompasses state tort actions, preemption
poses dire consequences for private tort plaintiffs.17
The extent of federal preemption of state tort actions has been
particularly unclear in cases involving products covered by the Medi-
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."). The concern about
tort liability is particularly relevant when the potential for large damage awards may have
the effect of inhibiting medical progress and technology. See Slater v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f experimental procedures are subject to
hindsight evaluation by juries, so that failed experiments threaten to impose enormous
tort liability on the experimenter, there will be fewer experimental treatments, and pa-
tients will suffer."); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898, 908 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973) ("Carried to other fields of medical research and the discovery of innova-
tive drugs and techniques, the burden of plaintiff's thesis would preclude the use of a
newly discovered drug that cures or prevents cancer .... "); Epstein, supra note 11, at
1154 ("At some point, if the number of false positives attributed to a vaccine rises suffi-
ciently, then the private costs imposed upon the manufacturer diverge from the social
costs of the vaccine. Systematic underproduction results.... [Producers] will leave the
market."); Alan J. Weisbard, On Not Compensating for Bad Outcomes to Biomedical
Innovations: A Response and Modest Proposal, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161,1164-65 (1987)
(distinguishing critical nature of medical innovation from other areas of technology).
Congress has recognized unique problems associated with delays in medical device intro-
duction, which are often attributed to manufacturers' fears of tort liability. See 141
CONG. REC. H2942 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995) ("Because of our liability lottery, ...
[p]roducts are kept off the market, or withdrawn after introduction.... 'Innovative new
products are not being developed or are being withheld from the market because of li-
ability concerns.'" (statement of Rep. Oxley) (quoting statement from the American
Medical Association)). See generally Epstein, supra note 11, at 1150 ("[M]odern common
law creates a bias, intensified by the discretion left to juries, toward finding all warnings
inadequate when judged by the standards of hindsight."); Lyndon, supra note 3, at 139
("Tort law undermines regulation ... by imposing on firms a superfluous and disorgan-
ized second layer of legal controls.").
17. See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Too
ready a tendency to declare the state protective shield replaced by the still somewhat
spotty federal protections will leave many injured persons without recourse."). Writing in
response to a lower court decision that expanded preemption of state tort remedies,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), Professor Laurence Tribe
stated:
It is the broader ramifications of the Third Circuit's ruling that are most
ominous. That court's view of preemption has the burning force of a prairie fire,
and it is hard to see what structures of state compensation would survive the en-
suing conflagration. Food, drugs, cosmetics and toxic substances are all
governed in some manner by Federal warning laws. If innocent people are in-
jured because of inadequate warnings, or because advertisements downplay the
product's dangers, are all of them barred by Federal law from pursuing tort
claims in state court? If so, the circuit court's ruling is cause for a knowing
snicker in corporate board rooms across the country.
Laurence H. Tribe, Anti-Cigarette Suits: Federalism with Smoke and Mirrors, THE
NATION, June 7, 1986, at 788, 790. Professor Tribe was one of the lawyers for the plain-
tiffs in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), the case that is the subject of this
Note. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 1, Medtronic (Nos.
95-754 and 95-886).
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cal Device Amendments of 197618 ("MDA") to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.19 The MDA preemption defense has been
litigated in cases involving a wide variety of products, including tam-
pons,' collagen anti-wrinkle creams," intraocular eye lenses," penile
prostheses,' heart valves,24 spinal cord stimulators,2' knee prosthe-
ses,26 and pacemakers. 27 The statute prohibits states from enforcing
"any requirement" concerning medical devices that is "different
from, or in addition to" requirements imposed by the federal gov-
ernment.' But, as is the case with many other preemption clauses, it
is unclear whether the prohibition applies only to state positive law
enactments (statutes and regulations), or bars state common-law ac-
tions as well. The widely varying interpretations of the MDA's
preemption language by the circuit courts reflects this uncertainty.29
Until recently, the United States Supreme Court had been of little
help in resolving the ambiguity. No decisions related directly to
18. Pub. L. No. 94-295,90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-
360k (1994)).
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1994), amended by Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489. Compare, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477,
480 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that MDA preempts most state tort claims), vacated and re-
manded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), with Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459-60
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that MDA does not preempt state tort claims). For a discussion
of the confusion in the circuits over MDA preemption, see infra notes 257-73 and accom-
panying text.
20. See, e.g., Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that tort claims based on inadequate labeling of tampons were preempted, but
design, construction, and composition claims were not).
21. See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that all tort claims over anti-wrinkle injections were preempted).
22. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540,546 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that all claims for defective intraocular eye lenses were preempted).
23. See, e.g., English, 67 F.3d at 483-84 (holding that strict liability, negligence, and
breach of implied warranty claims for penile prosthesis were preempted, but breach of
express warranty claim was not preempted).
24. See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 761 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that all tort remedies for defective heart valve were preempted).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 717, 720-21 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(holding that claims over certain highly regulated components of spinal cord stimulator
were preempted, but that claims over less stringently regulated components were not
preempted).
26. See, e.g., Goldstein v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 887 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (N.D. I11.
1995) (discussing MDA preemption of claims over a defective knee prosthesis in the con-
text of deciding whether the federal issues involved justified removing the case to federal
court).
27. See, e.g., Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 (Ist Cir. 1994) (holding that all
claims over a defective pacemaker were preempted).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
29. See infra note 260 (listing the conflicting decisions).
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medical devices, and the most pertinent case, Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,' which dealt with cigarette labeling, established a dis-
jointed, ad hoc framework for preemption analysis that one
dissenting Justice aptly characterized as a "crazy quilt."'
1
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,2 the Supreme Court finally consid-
ered the issue of federal preemption of state tort liability for medical
devices under the MDA. The Court held that state products liability
claims over an allegedly defective pacemaker were not preempted by
§ 360k(a) of the MDA, which prohibits states from maintaining "any
requirement" different from or in addition to requirements under the
MDA 3 However, the Court was not unanimous in its reasoning.
Justice Stevens, writing the plurality opinion of the Court for himself
and three other Justices, based his analysis on the legislative history
and context of the statute and concluded that Congress did not intend
to preempt the particular tort claims in this case.' Justice Breyer,
however, agreed with the plurality's result simply because he de-
ferred to the non-preemptive interpretation of the MDA espoused by
the FDA regulations. 5 Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, concurred in part and
dissented in part and argued that based on its plain meaning, the pre-
emption language in the MDA barred most state tort claims.36
30. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
31. Id. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun stated: "I cannot believe that Congress in-
tended to create such a hodgepodge of allowed and disallowed claims." Id. at 543
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
32. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (plurality opinion).
33. See id. at 2259.
34. See id. at 2245-48,2259.
35. See id. at 2259-61 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Breyer based his concurrence not on his own interpretation of the word
"requirements," but rather on his deference to administrative agency interpretation. See
infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's concurrence).
36. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
dissent). The division between the Justices in Medtronic reflects a reversal of their nor-
mal ideological roles. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist are usually stalwart supporters of state sovereignty and federalism. See United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (expressing, in an opinion
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, unwillingness to "convert
congressional authority... to a general police power of the sort retained by the States");
id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (disapproving of statute that "forecloses the States
from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay
claim by right of history and expertise"). Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Kennedy's
Lopez concurrence. See id (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a candid discussion of the
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Medtronic has great significance for products liability litigants. 7
Despite its statute-specific factual pattern, the reasoning of Med-
tronic might be extended to apply to other federal regulatory statutes
as well." Medtronic also seems to depart from Cipollone, wherein the
federalism considerations motivating the current Court, see M. David Gelfand & Keith
Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a "Conservative" Court: Currents and
Cross-Currents From Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1443, 1449-55 (1990)
(surveying Justice O'Connor's notable recent opinions on federalism). In Medironic,
however, the "conservative" Justices argued that federal law preempted state law. See
Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This irony is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 322-34.
37. The plaintiffs' bar, which had become frustrated with the success of the preemp-
tion defense, celebrated the Medtronic decision. See, e.g., Brian Wolfman & Allison
Zieve, Litigating Preemption Issues After Medtronic v. Lohr, pt. VI (visited Oct. 19, 1996)
<http://www.alexanderlaw.contxt/article/medtron.shtml> ("With perhaps a few excep-
tions, Medtronic lifts the burden of the preemption defense from tort plaintiffs in
personal-injury cases involving medical devices."). Brian Wolfman, on behalf of the Pub-
lic Citizen Litigation Group, was the Lohrs' counsel of record in Medtronic. See
Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245.
Prior to Medtronic, one commentator had worried that "[p]reemption law threatens
to become, as a weapon against state economic and social regulation, the modern-day
equivalent of Lochner v. New York." Jonathan S. Massey, Federal Preemption of Medical
Device Tort Claims: Not What Congress (or the Doctor) Ordered, TRIAL, June 1994, at
58, 58; see also Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A. Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption
in Products Liability Cases-Federalism in the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV. 603, 604 (1987)
(arguing that lower court decisions supporting preemption of tort law "represent a form
of judicial activism that, in derogation of constitutional principles, eliminates state reme-
dies simply to promote the court's own view of social policy"). Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), is an infamous case in which the Court held that the Constitution prohib-
ited states from enacting progressive legislation to protect workers. See id. at 64.
On the other hand, manufacturers view Medtronic as a setback because it reduces the
effectiveness of a key defense. See Lars Noah, The Preemption Morass: Medtronic
Leaves Muddled the Question of Whether or When Federal Law Preempts State Tort
Claims Against Defective Medical Devices, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S-37. After
all, Medtronic teaches that even if manufacturers comply with all applicable federal
regulations, they are still vulnerable to state products liability actions. See Medtronic, 116
S. Ct. at 2251-52.
38. Most statutes with express preemption clauses use language similar to the lan-
guage in the MDA. See Noah, supra note 37, at S-38 (noting that although the outcome in
Medtronic depended specifically on the MDA, "these statutory preemption provisions
pose important recurring problems"); see also supra note 13 (listing some statutes with
similar preemption language); cf. R. David Allnut, Note, FIFRA Preemption of State
Common Law Claims After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68 WASH. L. REV. 859, 866-
67 (1993) (analogizing from Cipollone, which involved a federal cigarette labeling statute,
to find preemptive effect of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act on
state law tort claims). But see Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258 ("[T]here are significant tex-
tual and historical differences between the Cipollone statute and § 360k, and the meaning
of words must always be informed by the environment within which they are situated.").
The importance of Medtronic outside the medical device industry is illustrated by the
fact that General Motors Corp. filed an amicus brief in the case. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae General Motors Corp. in Support of Petitioner, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-
886). Explaining its interest in the case, General Motors said that "[t]he similarity in
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Court had found preemption of state claims based on almost identical
language in another statute. 9 Yet, because of the internal division on
the Court and questions about whether the holding can be applied
outside the MDA context, Medtronic fails to completely resolve the
uncertainties generated by earlier preemption cases.'4
This Note first reviews the facts and procedural history of Med-
tronic." It analyzes the plurality opinion by Justice Stevens,42 the
concurrence by Justice Breyer,43 and the dissent by Justice
O'Connor.' Next, it provides background information, beginning
with brief overviews of Florida products liability law45 and of the pre-
emption doctrine in general.' It explains the statute at issue, the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, its legislative history, and the
corresponding FDA regulations.47 The Note then reviews the case
law on federal preemption of products liability, focusing on the influ-
ential Cipollone decision." Next, in a detailed analysis of issues
raised by Medtronic, the Note (1) discusses whether Medtronic and
Cipollone are reconcilable or fundamentally inconsistent;4 (2) con-
cludes that because the Justices agreed on certain key points, the
apparent division on the Court in Medtronic is probably overstated;"
(3) raises the issue of federalism and explores the irony that the same
Justices who usually support states' rights would have found preemp-
tion; and (4) speculates about the future of products liability
preemption, both within and without the context of the MDA 2 This
discussion demonstrates that in Medtronic, the Court did not patch
structure of the statutory provisions concerning preemption contained in the FDCA and
the [National Traffic and Motor Vehicle] Safety Act ... makes the resolution of certain
issues in this case potentially relevant to similar issues that have arisen under the Safety
Act." Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
39. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521 (1992).
40. See Noah, supra note 37, at S-37; cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 556 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[Q]uestions raised by today's
decision [involving federal preemption of products liability] will fill the lawbooks for
years to come.").
41. See infra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 147-96 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 197-273 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 279-301 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 302-21 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 322-34 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 335-55 and accompanying text.
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the "crazy quilt"53 of Cipollone-rather, the Court wove more colors
into it.
54
In 1982, Medtronic, Inc., a medical device manufacturer, intro-
duced the Model 4011 pacemaker lead, which basically followed past
designs.51 In November 1982, the FDA issued a substantial equiva-
lence letter declaring that Medtronic's model was "'substantially
equivalent to devices introduced into interstate commerce' prior to
the effective date of the [MDA]."56 Because of this finding, Med-
tronic's pacemaker qualified for a special expedited review process
and did not have to undergo the more thorough review applicable to
new designs.' Five years after the pacemaker was approved, doctors
implanted Lora Lohr with a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with the
Model 4011 lead.58 In December 1990, the pacemaker failed, alleg-
edly due to a defect in the lead. Lohr experienced a complete heart
block that required emergency surgery.'
Lohr and her husband sued Medtronic in a Florida state court,
alleging negligence and strict liability.6" Under the negligence theory,
the Lohrs charged that Medtronic had breached its duty of reason-
able care by using defective materials and failing to warn Lohr or her
53. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 543 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
54. See Noah, supra note 37, at S-38 ("[T]he [Medtronic] Court has squandered a
valuable opportunity to clear up some of the growing confusion about the application of
this newfangled [preemption] defense.").
55. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248. A pacemaker lead is the component that
transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the "pulse generator" to the
heart. See id.
56. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B) (1994)).
57. See ic The expedited review process, known as the "section 510(k) process"
(after the original numbering of the MDA) or the "substantial equivalency process," was
intended to prevent the unnecessary duplication that would result if full review was nec-
essary for every minor variation on the same basic medical device. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(b)(1)(B). Congress also designed it to remove a competitive advantage that would
otherwise accrue to firms whose medical devices had been on the market prior to the
enactment of the Amendments. See FDA Oversight: Medical Devices, Hearings Before
the Subcomrn. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 97th Cong. 9 (1982). See generally Jonathan Kahan, Premarket Approval versus
Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
510, 514-15 (1984) (explaining the rationale for the section 510(k) process). For a discus-
sion of the section 510(k) process, see infra text accompanying notes 152-57.
58. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id The Lohrs also included a breach of warranty count, but it was dismissed
for failure to state a claim under Florida law. See id. For a discussion of the substantive
Florida law regarding the Lohrs' claims, see infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
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physicians of the known possibility of failure. 2 Medtronic removed
the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida based on diversity of citizenship.63 Then Medtronic moved
for summary judgment based on a federal preemption defense.' The
district court first denied Medtronic's motion for summary judgment,
but later reversed that decision and dismissed the Lohrs' entire com-
plaint due to a change in the substantive law of the Eleventh Circuit.'
The Lohrs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and
affirmed in part in an elaborate, convoluted opinion66 remindful of
Justice Blackmun's Cipollone prediction of a "crazy quilt" of pre-
empted and non-preempted claims.67 The court of appeals held that
the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not preempted, but the negli-
gent manufacture and failure-to-warn claims were preempted. The
court allowed the strict liability claim, but limited it to the theory that
the pacemaker lead was "unreasonably dangerous"; the court refused
to let the plaintiffs "revive their preempted negligent manufacturing
and failure to warn claims in the form of a strict liability claim."69
Both parties filed petitions for certiorari.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict be-
tween the circuits. The Court split into two factions: Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg constituted the core of the
62. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
63. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). The district court's opinion was not reported.
64. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
65. See id. at 2249. The change in law occurred with Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d
194 (11th Cir. 1994), wherein the Eleventh Circuit announced-without discussion or
explanation-that it would henceforth follow the Seventh Circuit decision of Slater v.
Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992), which had upheld preemption of
tort claims by the MDA. See Duncan, 12 F.3d at 194.
66. The result of the Cipollone analysis is that some claims are preempted, and others
are not preempted; thus, neither side is likely to be completely satisfied by the outcome.
See Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1352 ("The Court's decision to preempt some, but not all of
Appellants' claims is sure to please neither party .... The lines and distinctions we draw
in today's decision are not always neat or easy .... "). The court of appeals insinuated
that the patchwork approach directly reflected congressional intent. See id. ("Any dis-
pleasure with that design should be directed toward Congress.").
67. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 542-43 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
68. See Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1347-49 (design claims not preempted); id. at 1350
(manufacture claims preempted); id. at 1350-51 (failure-to-warn claims not preempted).
69. See id. at 1347-49; cf. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80;84 (Fla. 1976)
("[T]he distinctions [between different theories of recovery within products liability] fre-
quently have more theoretical than practical significance.").
70. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250.
71. See id.
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plurality.' Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court, holding
that none of the Lohrs' claims were preempted.7 1 Justice Breyer con-
curred in part and concurred in the judgment.74 The second faction
was led by Justice O'Connor, who filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined.75
Justice Stevens began by considering Medtronic's argument that
the express language of 21 U.S.C. § 360k automatically preempted all
of the Lohrs' claims.76 His inclination against the preemption argu-
ment was immediately evident.' He emphasized that Congress
would have used a word like "remedy," not "requirement," in the
statute if it had intended to preempt common-law tort actions.78
The plurality expounded several other rationales against inclu-
sion of common-law actions within the meaning of "requirement."
First, it found that Congress used the word "requirement" elsewhere
in the statute in conjunction with discussions of positive law enact-
ments.79 Second, it noted that § 360k(b), which allows the FDA to
exempt any state "requirement" from statutory preemption, had
72. See id- at 2240-58.
73. See id& at 2258. At first glance, it is surprising that Justice Stevens also wrote the
majority opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), since Medtronic
seems to reverse, or at least, substantially modify Cipollone. However, as this Note will
point out, a great deal of continuity exists between Cipollone and Medtronic. See infra
notes 283-301 and accompanying text. In light of the parallels, Justice Stevens's common
authorship of the two opinions is not so surprising.
74. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
75. See iW. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See id. at 2251. The preemption clause provides:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
77. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251. Justice Stevens stated: "Under Medtronic's
view of the statute, Congress effectively precluded state courts from affording state con-
sumers any protection from injuries resulting from a defective medical device....
Medtronic's construction of § 360k would therefore have the perverse effect of granting
complete immunity ...... Id.
78. See id.
79. See id. For example, § 360k(a)(2) refers to "a requirement applicable to the de-
vice under this Act"-that is, a positive enactment of the Federal, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2); see also infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text
(discussing this reference and other places in the MDA where "requirement" means posi-
tive enactment).
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been used to exempt only state statutes and regulations." Third, the
plurality examined the legislative history behind the MDA' The
Court indicated that although Congress was concerned about the
burden on the industry, Congress thought of this burden as coming
from positive law enactments rather than from common-law tort ac-
tions.'
Having disposed of Medtronic's argument that the statute pre-
empted common-law actions generally, the plurality analyzed each of
the Lohrs' individual claims to determine whether the statute pre-
empted them. This inquiry involved a comparison between the
duties sought to be established by each of the plaintiffs' claims and
the requirements imposed by federal regulations.' On the defective
design claim, Medtronic argued that the FDA's conditioning of ap-
proval on the Model 4011's "substantial equivalence" to preexisting,
approved pacemaker leads amounted to an MDA requirement that
could not be supplemented or affected by common-law design stan-
80. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252 n.11. Section 360k(b) provides:
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may,
by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, ex-
empt from subsection (a) [of this section] ... a requirement of such State or
political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if-
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this Act...
or
(2) the requirement
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be
in violation of any applicable requirement under this Act.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(b). The FDA exemptions are listed at 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53 to .101
(1996). See infra note 168 (explaining that the exemption process reflects an under-
standing that state tort claims would not be preempted).
81. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252-53; see infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text
(reviewing the legislative history).
82. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 ("[N]othing in the hearings, the committee re-
ports, or the debates suggest[s] that any proponent of the legislation intended a sweeping
pre-emption of traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors
of defective devices.").
83. See id. at 2253-54. By performing this claim-by-claim analysis, Justice Stevens
adhered to the Cipollone framework of evaluating the preemption effects on each theory
of liability separately, even though he ultimately reached a different result than in Cipol-
lone. Compare id. at 2257-58 ("The statute and regulations, therefore, require a careful
comparison between the allegedly pre-empting federal requirement and the allegedly pre-
empted state requirement to determine whether they fall within the intended pre-emptive
scope of the statute and regulations."), with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 523-24 (1992) ("[W]e must look to each of the petitioner's common-law claims to
determine whether it is in fact pre-empted. The central inquiry in each case is straight-
forward: we ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages
action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition .... ' " (footnote omitted)).
84. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2257-58.
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dardsY. The plurality rejected this argument, reasoning that the sec-
tion 510(k) process allowing expedited review of substantially
equivalent devices was intended to encourage industry competition
and obviate duplicative review, not to endorse the safety of those de-
vices.'
On the Lohrs' negligent labeling and manufacturing claims, the
plurality noted that the FDA had imposed labeling requirements87
and "Good Manufacturing Practices,"" which constituted general
federal requirements within the meaning of § 360kY The Lohrs ar-
gued, however, that because "§ 360k(a)(1) expressly states that a
federal requirement must be 'applicable to the device' in question
before it has any pre-emptive effect,"" this "device-specific" re-
quirement significantly narrows the scope of MDA preemption."
The labeling and Good Manufacturing Practices regulations, far from
being specifically designed for pacemakers, are general and applica-
ble to all devices under the MDA? After conducting a "careful
85. See id. at 2254.
86. See id. at 2254-55. The Court unanimously agreed that the "substantial equiva-
lency" process did not produce requirements preempting defective design claims. See id.
at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of
the significance of this consensus, see infra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
87. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.109(b)-(e) (1996).
88. See id. §§ 820.1 to .198.
89. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256.
90. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (1994)). The Lohrs relied for this proposition
on an FDA regulation, which reads:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby
making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the de-
vice different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration
requirements.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (emphasis added).
91. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256-57. Medtronic countered the argument that
requirements must be "device-specific" in order to be preempted by responding that in
§ 360k(a), "the phrase 'with respect to a device' modifies the verbs 'establish' and
'continue in effect' rather than the noun 'requirement.'" Brief for Cross-Respondent
Medtronic, Inc. at 14, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
Medtronic argued that the Lohrs' "device-specificity" theory proved too much-after all,
the device-specificity requirement would protect from preemption not only common-law
claims, but also generally applicable state regulations and statutes-and that result would
clearly be inconsistent with Congress's purpose. See id. at 15. Also, the interpretation
that state requirements do not include common-law claims would create an "untenable
distinction" between states that have codified their tort doctrines and those that have not.
See id. at 13 & n.11.
92. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258. The Lohrs' brief contended that "the GMPs
are little more than common-sense standards for the production of any product." Brief
for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 44, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-
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comparison between the allegedly pre-empting federal requirement
and the allegedly pre-empted state requirement,"9 3 the plurality
agreed with the Lohrs that "the federal requirements reflect impor-
tant but entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally,
not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device ... [intended to
be protected from] potentially contradictory state requirements. 9 4
Since the federal requirements were not designed with a particular
product in mind, the Court held that they did not have preemptive
effect.'
Moreover, in order for preemption to occur, the FDA regulation
(21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)) requires not only that the preempting FDA
requirements be "specific counterpart regulations ... applicable to a
particular device,"96 but also that the preempted state requirements
not be "of general applicability."'  The plurality held that duties im-
posed on manufacturers by tort law are inherently general. For that
reason, they "are no more a threat to federal requirements than
would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention regula-
tions and zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and
supervision of a workforce."9 Thus, Medtronic's preemption argu-
ment failed both prongs of the § 808.1(d) analysis: the preempting
federal labeling and manufacturing requirements were not designed
with a specific device in mind, and the state common-law duties
sought to be preempted were not device-specific." °
Finally, the Court declined to reach the question of whether the
MDA could ever preempt a common-law tort action;.'. since none of
the Lohrs' particular claims were preempted, a general pronounce-
ment was unnecessary.0 2 However, the Court speculated that "[i]t
886).
93. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2257-58. The court analogized from the 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d) federal requirement/state requirement comparison to a similar analysis in
Cipollone, but emphasized that the analyses were different. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at
2258 n.19 ("If anything, the language of the MDA's pre-emption statute and its counter-
part regulations require an even more searching inquiry into the relationship between the
federal requirement and the state requirement at issue than was true under the statute in
Cipollone.").
94. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
95. See id.
96. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
97. Id. § 808.1(d)(1).
98. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 2258-59.
102. See id. at 2259.
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will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action
to issue a decree that has 'the effect of establishing a substantive re-
quirement for a specific device.' ,
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer argued that while the
language of the MDA could be read to preempt tort actions, the
Lohrs' claims were not preempted, because the applicable FDA
regulations had not effectuated the preemptive power authorized by
Congress."° He concurred in the judgment and concurred generally
with the plurality opinion, except for Part IV, which held that based
on legislative history and purpose, the MDA's reference to "any re-
quirement" did not encompass most state law actions,' and Part VI,
in which the plurality declined to reach the question of whether the
MDA could ever preempt a state law action.' 6 In opposition to Part
IV, Justice Breyer believed that the word "requirement" generally
was meant to encompass state tort actions.' 7 He took issue with the
plurality's apparent repudiation of the definition of "requirement"
adopted in Cipollone,"°8 and argued that this definition was transfer-
able to the medical device context. 9
103. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)).
104. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105. See id. at 2251-53. Justice Breyer stated, "I do not join Part IV, which emphasizes
the differences between the MDA and the pre-emption statute at issue in Cipollone, be-
cause those differences are not, in my view, relevant in this case." Id. at 2261-62 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
106. See id. at 2258-59. Justice Breyer did not object to the overall theme of Part VI
that preemption possibilities remained open. See id. at 2262 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Rather, having concluded that "requirement"
clearly did include a state-law tort action, he disagreed with the plurality's assertion that
"[i]t will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action" to find pre-
emption, id. at 2259. See id. at 2262 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
107. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
On this point, he was in agreement with Justice O'Connor and the dissenters. See id. at
2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See id. at 2259-60 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The plurality found that despite the common use of the word "requirement" in the stat-
utes at issue in Medtronic and Cipollone, the preemptive effect of the two statutes was
different. See id. at 2252; id. at 2258 n.19; cf Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Pre-
emption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 918 (1994)
("Although it would make life simpler if Congress used words consistently from statute to
statute, it does not."). The argument that a word like "requirement" can have a different
meaning in every statute that Congress enacts hardly bodes well for consistency and pre-
dictability in the Court's preemption jurisprudence. See JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 261 (1975) ("[A] word should carry its meaning from
one statute over into another related statute, just as a word should carry one meaning
throughout a single enactment.").
109. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259-60 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
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Justice Breyer next asserted that the ambiguous nature of § 360k
necessitated an inquiry into the FDA's interpretation of the preemp-
tion clause."' Even if Congress had clearly intended to preempt, he
argued, the wording of the FDA regulations should be the focus of
the inquiry, because the regulations themselves create the preempt-
ing federal requirements." '  Justice Breyer thought that the
dispositive regulatory provision was 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d), which pro-
vided that state requirements were preempted only when there are
"' 'specific [federal] requirements applicable to a particular de-
vice.' ,11 2  Thus, all of the FDA safety requirements that applied
generally to all medical devices, and not to particular devices indi-
vidually, were not preemptive.1 Justice Breyer believed that while
the MDA clearly allowed full preemption of state tort claims, the
FDA's intent that its non-product-specific regulations not preempt
should be controlling." The implication of Justice Breyer's opinion
in the judgment). According to Justice Breyer, "insofar as the MDA pre-empts a state
requirement embodied in a state statute, rule, regulation, or other administrative action,
it would also pre-empt a similar requirement that takes the form of a standard of care or
behavior imposed by a state-law tort action." Id at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer noted that the plurality never explicitly
rejected this proposition. See id (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
110. See id. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The seminal case cited to establish the preeminence of agency interpretations of statutes
is Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Counci, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In
Chevron, the Court held that courts interpreting an ambiguous statute must defer to the
reasonable interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute. See id. at
842-45; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721
(1985) (giving substantial weight to FDA's view of whether a local ordinance concerning
blood plasma was preempted).
111. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
112. Id. at 2261 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)) (alteration in original).
113. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This was a
key point about which Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice O'Connor. Compare id.
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[N]o law forces the FDA
to make its requirements pre-emptive if it does not think it appropriate."), with id. at 2263
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court errs when it em-
ploys an agency's narrowing construction of a statute where no such deference is
warranted.").
114. Justice Breyer adopted the FDA's view that in order for preemption to occur,
both the federal and state requirements must be "device-specific." See id. at 2261
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d)). None of the federal requirements applicable to pacemakers were device-
specific. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Breyer did not specifically discuss the various general regulatory requirements (e.g., the
substantial equivalence finding, the Good Manufacturing Practices, etc.) that applied to
the Medtronic pacemaker as well as to other medical devices.
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is that the MDA would preempt no claims like the Lohrs' unless and
until the FDA alters its regulations to more freely effectuate the pre-
emption power delegated by Congress."'
Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part began with the assertion that state common-law damages actions
clearly impose "requirement[s]" within the meaning of § 360k(a)."6
Justice O'Connor considered Cipollone dispositive on this point, and
quoted an excerpt from Cipollone which stated that the term "any
requirement" is not limited to positive enactments,"' because com-
mon-law damages could influence manufacturers' conduct at least as
effectively as direct regulatory or statutory mandates.' As for the
MDA, Justice O'Connor took a "plain language" approach: "If
§ 360k's language is given its ordinary meaning, it clearly pre-empts
any state common-law action that would impose a requirement dif-
115. Cf. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714 (noting that an agency's intent to pre-
empt state law is dispositive, and that the only remaining question is whether that
agency's action is authorized); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Pre-
sumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 883
(1995) (interpreting Hillsborough County as saying that "the cost of incorrectly deter-
mining the agency's intent regarding preemption is relatively slight to the extent that the
agency can easily clarify that intent by subsequent regulation or other action"). In Fidel-
ity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. DeLaCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), the Court said:
Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than Federal statutes.
Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his
judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has ex-
ceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator
promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law, the court's inquiry is
similarly limited ....
Id. at 153-54 (citation omitted); see also CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 3.59 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (discussing impact of federal agency rules on
state law); cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 501-08
(2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that the existence of an administrative agency within a statutory
scheme may make statutory preemption more likely).
116. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas. See iL (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521-22 (1992)). According to Justice O'Connor,
"[w]hether relating to the labeling of cigarettes or the manufacture of medical devices,
state common-law damages actions operate to require manufacturers to comply with
common-law duties." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), a case quoted in Cipollone, 505
U.S. at 521-22, the Court stated that "[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed
is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. at 247. But cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 537 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing as out of
context the Cipollone plurality's simplistic reliance on Garmon).
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ferent from, or in addition to, that applicable under the FDCA-just
as it would pre-empt a state statute or regulation that had that ef-
fect.'. 9 With such clear statutory language, the dissenters believed
that the Court's inquiry into the agency interpretation and regula-
tions limiting preemptive effect was unwarranted." Contrary to
Justice Breyer's assertions, Justice O'Connor believed the FDA
could not obstruct congressional intent by narrowing the scope of
preemption through the device-specificity requirement. 2'
Justice O'Connor next analyzed the particular tort claims raised
by the Lohrs.' First, the defective design claim survived preemption
because the "substantial equivalence" process, which regulates prod-
uct design, "seeks merely to establish whether a pre-1976 device and
a post-1976 device are equivalent."'' The process did not impose any
requirements on device manufacturers and, therefore, it had no pre-
emptive effect. 4 Second, any of the Lohrs' claims that merely sought
damages for Medtronic's alleged violation of federal regulations were
not preempted." Such claims did not impose requirements
"'different from, or in addition to' requirements under federal
law."'26 Justice O'Connor drew a distinction between "different or
additional requirements" and "different or additional remedies."' 27
To the extent that plaintiffs sought merely to enforce existing federal
requirements, their claims would not be preempted."2
119. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
120. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must
give effect to clear congressional intent).
121. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's
reliance on the regulations).
122. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
123. Id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. See id& (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. See id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a)(1) (1994)).
127. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On this point,
even the dissenters rejected Medtronic's argument-a restatement of the argument set
forth by Justice Scalia in Cipollone-that state law remedies for federal violations are
preempted. See iU (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). For an explanation of why this concession is important, see infra
notes 305-11 and accompanying text.
128. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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However, Justice O'Connor argued that the Lohrs' claims were
preempted insofar as they "would compel Medtronic to comply with
requirements different from or in addition to those required by the
FDA."'29  For example, the Lohrs' common-law mismanufacture
claim would impose requirements above and beyond the Good
Manufacturing Practices' promulgated by the FDA."' Likewise, ex-
tensive labeling requirements imposed by the FDA' preempted
common-law failure-to-warn claims that would establish more ex-
acting labeling standards.'3' Justice O'Connor rejected the plurality's
premise that a regulatory provision must be "device-specific" before
it can preempt parallel state requirements.4
At the source of the preemption debate in Medtronic was Flor-
ida's common law of products liability.' 35 Like the law of other states,
Florida common law enables plaintiffs to recover for personal inju-
ries caused by manufacturer negligence, 3 a defect giving rise to strict
liability, 37 or the manufacturer's breach of warranty." The
in part).
129. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20 to .198 (1996) (regulating every stage of the manufactur-
ing process: organization, personnel, buildings, equipment, process controls,
recordkeeping, etc.).
131. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
132. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.109.
133. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
134. See id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("These ... re-
quirements are certainly applicable to the device manufactured by Medtronic. Section
360k(a) requires no more specificity than that ... ."). The plurality derived the "device-
specificity" requirement from the applicable FDA regulations. See id. at 2256-57; 21
C.F.R. § 808.1(d). Justice O'Connor believed that those regulations did not merit defer-
ence because they conflicted with the clear purpose of the MDA. See Medtronic, 116 S.
Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The statute makes
no mention of a requirement of specificity, and there is no sound basis for determining
that such a restriction on 'any requirement' exists.").
135. The substantive provisions of Florida law never surfaced in Medtronic because
the preemption issue dominated the litigation. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255 ("[T]he
precise contours of [the Lohrs'] theory of recovery have not yet been defined .... ).
136. See Christopher v. Cutter Lab., 53 F.3d 1184, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Florida
products liability law required plaintiffs to prove ... that Armour's alleged negligence ...
was the proximate cause of [injury]."); Clark v. Boeing Co., 395 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("In order to establish negligence, appellants must prove the exis-
tence of a duty to protect them, a breach of that duty, and injury sustained as a proximate
cause [sic] of the breach.").
137. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86 (Fla. 1976) ("[S]trict liabil-
ity should be imposed ... when a product the manufacturer places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being."); Rostocki v. Southwest Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d
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"requirements" that Florida tort law imposes are fairly typical.'39
Manufacturers have a duty not to negligently design and construct
their products,"4 and "to take reasonable precautions to supply users
with an adequate warning notice that would place them on their
guard against the harmful consequences that might result from use of
the commodity.', 41 "At the heart of each theory," one Florida ap-
pellate court noted, "is the requirement that the plaintiff's injury
must have been caused by some defect in the product.' 1 42
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to pass
legislation that preempts state law.143 There are several types of pre-
emption. Under the doctrine of "conflict preemption," when federal
law comes into conflict with state law, federal law controls.' 4 A sec-
475,476 (Fla. 1973) (" '[I]t is well settled in this jurisdiction that the manufacturer or pro-
ducer of a product intended for human consumption or intimate body use is held strictly
liable, without fault, for consequential injuries to a consumer or user resulting from a
defect in such product.' ") (quoting Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So. 2d
115, 119 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., concurring)); Light v. Weldarc Co., 569 So. 2d 1302, 1304
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that strict liability attaches when "the product, at the
time it left the seller's hands, is in a condition not contemplated by the consumer, which
condition is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer").
138. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963) ("[T]he basis
of [implied warranty] liability is the undertaking or agreement, attributed by law, to be
responsible in the event the thing sold is not in fact merchantable or fit for its ordinary
use or purposes.").
139. See, e.g., West, 336 So. 2d at 87 (adopting the formulation of strict liability found
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)); Copeland v. Celotex Corp.,
447 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("In a modem products liability suit, recov-
ery is generally predicated upon a trireme of negligence, implied warranty, and strict
liability."), quashed on other grounds, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985); 2 M. STUART MADDEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 24.1, at 389-92 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995).
140. See Douglas v. Winkley Co., 363 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that summary judgment for defendant was improper where plaintiff pled that
defendant negligently designed and constructed a leg brace, and that plaintiff suffered
injury as a direct result).
141. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 608 (Fla. 1958). A more recent Florida
case, Light v. Weldarc Co., limited the duty to warn to "defects or dangers which are
known or reasonably foreseeable by the supplier and are unknown or unforeseen by the
user." 569 So. 2d at 1303.
142. Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
143. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes the superiority of federal
law: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
144. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)
(finding that preemption automatically occurs when simultaneous compliance with both
federal and state law would be impossible); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132,142-43 (1963) (same).
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ond type of preemption is "field preemption"-even if there is no
direct conflict, state law is preempted if the scheme of federal regula-
tion is so pervasive that it effectively leaves no room for additional
state regulation.145 Third, if a federal statute expressly says that it
preempts state law, as the MDA does, that provision must be given
effect.
146
Twenty years ago, Congress passed the MDA 47 which classifies
medical devices 48 into three categories, depending on the risk to the
public posed by the device.149 Originally, manufacturers of Class III
medical devices had to submit their products to a thorough FDA
premarket approval process.' This process requires extensive re-
search, voluminous submissions, and the involvement of the FDA's
Office of Chief Counsel."' Today the requirement of premarket ap-
proval is largely meaningless. The MDA exempts from premarket
approval devices that existed prior to its enactment in 1976.152 And,
in order to avoid granting manufacturers of such pre-1976 devices a
near-monopoly on their products, the MDA also allows devices that
are "substantially equivalent" to preexisting devices to bypass the
145. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it.").
146. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("[W]hen Congress has
'unmistakably ... ordained' that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce,
state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall.") (quoting Florida Lime, 373 U.S.
at 142).
147. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c to 360k
(1994)).
148. For examples of covered medical devices, see supra text accompanying notes 20-
27.
149. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a). First, devices that present no unreasonable risk to the
public are classified as Class I devices, which are subject to minimal regulation. See id.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A). Class II is the next increment of risk; Class II devices obligate manufac-
turers to comply with federal performance regulations. See id. § 360c(a)(1)(B). The
pacemaker at issue in Medtronic was classified as a Class III device-the highest risk
level. See 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610 (1996). Class III devices are defined as those that are
"purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a
use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health," 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I) or "present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or in-
jury," id. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II).
150. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a)(2). The premarket approval process is designed to give
the FDA a reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. See S. REP. NO. 94-
33, at 14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1083 (discussing premarket review
as "appropriate to insure safety and effectiveness or to reduce or eliminate unreasonable
risk of illness or injury").
151. For a helpful step-by-step summary of the premarket approval process, see Ka-
han, supra note 57, at 512-14.
152. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
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lengthy review process."' Substantially equivalent devices do not
completely escape review-the manufacturers still must submit a
"premarket notification" to the FDA, M from which the FDA deter-
mines whether the device is in fact "substantially equivalent.
15
However, premarket notification is significantly faster and less finan-
cially burdensome on manufacturers than is full premarket review. 6
The FDA's finding of "substantial equivalence" does not denote offi-
cial approval of a device. 7 Medtronic took advantage of the section
510(k) process when it introduced the pacemaker lead at issue in
Medtronic.'58
Congress passed the MDA to provide a uniform, comprehensive
system of regulation that effectively balanced the needs of manufac-
turers and consumers. The House Report on the Amendments
states:
Those involved in the development, promotion, and ap-
plication of medical devices generally agree that the public
deserves more protection against unsafe, unproven, ineffec-
tive, and experimental medical devices. But this belief is
counterbalanced by an equally strong conviction that exces-
sive or ill-conceived Federal device regulation would stifle
progress in this field. 59
Thus, Congress passed the MDA with two main goals in mind: (1) to
ensure the utmost concern for safety of individuals; and (2) to create
a uniform, consistent scheme of regulation that would be conducive
153. See id. § 360e(b)(1)(B)(ii).
154. See id. § 360(k). The "premarket notification" process is sometimes called the
section 510(k) process, after the pre-codification numbering of the statute. See Med-
tronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247.
155. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247.
156. In 1989, it was estimated that the cost to manufacturers of the section 510(k) ap-
proach to market entry was $50 to $2,000; in contrast, the cost to manufacturers of the full
review process was $111,000 to $828,000. See Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and
Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 47 (1989). For this reason, the sec-
tion 510(k) process has replaced the full review process as the primary means by which
medical devices are evaluated by the FDA. See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device
Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 516 (1988) (emphasizing the predominance of the section
510(k) process).
157. See Adler, supra note 156, at 515-16.
158. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248; Letter from Robert G. Britain, Associate Direc-
tor for Device Evaluation, FDA, to Edward W. Numainville, Product Regulation
Manager, Medtronic, Inc. (Nov. 30, 1982), in Brief for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and
Michael Lohr at 10 app., 10-11 app., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886).
159. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 10 (1976).
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to beneficial medical innovations." Congress directed the
preemption clause at the second of these goals. The exact language
of § 360k(a) is as follows:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any re-
quirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any re-
quirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this Act.6
One view of § 360k is that its plain language mandates preemp-
tion, especially in light of the definition of "requirement" espoused
by Cipollone.6 This view is reinforced by the fact that Congress did
not include a "saving clause" in the MDA expressly preserving com-
mon-law claims, as it did in two other statutes. 6" The rejoinder to this
interpretation is that evidence from other sections of the MDA, and
from the legislative history, fails to indicate any congressional intent
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir. 1993) (balancing
the need to protect the "idiosyncratic few" who are injured against the aggregate public
benefit from innovative medical devices, and concluding that the preemption clause was
intended to make the FDA requirements the "maximum protection afforded the individ-
ual user").
162. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
163. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("If § 360k's language is given its ordinary meaning, it clearly pre-empts any state
common-law action that would impose a requirement different from, or in addition to,
that applicable under the FDCA .... "); see also id at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("[I]n [Cipollone], the Court made clear that similar
language 'easily' encompassed tort actions .... (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521 (1992))).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994) (expressly allowing common-law tort claims to
survive despite preemption clause in the Consumer Product Safety Act); id. § 4406(c)
(expressly allowing common-law tort claims to survive despite preemption clause in the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986). Congress's deliber-
ate inclusion of a saving provision in these statutes suggests that no such saving provision
should be inferred in other statutes, such as the MDA. See DAVIES, supra note 108, at
260-61 (explaining the expresio unius est excluslo alterius canon of statutory construction).
But cf. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523 n.22 ("Under our analysis of § 5, these omissions [of
clauses expressly preempting or saving common law] make perfect sense: Congress was
neither pre-empting nor saving common law as a whole-it was simply pre-empting par-
ticular common-law claims, while saving others.").
[Vol. 751462
PATCHING THE "CRAZY QUILT"
to preempt tort claims.6' For example, the word "requirement" is
used, both in § 360k itself and in other sections of the MDA, to refer
specifically to positive law enactments. 6 In § 360k(a)(1) and (a)(2),
the word "requirement" indisputably refers to product regulations
imposed by the FDA.67 Section 360k(b) establishes a procedure by
which states can obtain exemptions for certain requirements; in the
context of this exemption procedure, "requirement" means state
positive enactments. 6 " Construing § 360k to preempt common-law
claims would yield awkward interpretations of provisions elsewhere
in the MDA as well.'69
The legislative history of the MDA gives few clues as to whether,
by preempting additional "requirements," Congress meant to bar
165. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 n.13 ("[I]f Congress had intended the MDA to
work this dramatic change in the availability of state-law remedies, one would expect
some reference to that change in the extensive contemporary reviews of the legislation.");
Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 923 n.128 (surveying the legislative history and finding
no mention of common-law tort claims).
166. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252; cf. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303,
307 (1961) ("The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps,
while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.").
167. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (referring to preemptive effect of "requirement[s]
applicable under this Act"); id. § 360k(a)(2) (same).
168. See id. § 360k(b) (requiring a state or one of its political subdivisions to apply to
the Secretary of Health and Human Services for such exemption). By their nature, com-
mon-law claims are not amenable to the sort of ad hoc, piecemeal rulemaking
contemplated by § 360k(b). See Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 927. As one court
noted in reference to the subsection, "if the term 'requirement' were interpreted so as to
include tort law, the exemption procedures would be rendered absurd; is the State sup-
posed to petition the Secretary of Health and Human Services after every verdict in favor
of an IUD tort plaintiff?" Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md.
1989).
169. For example, within § 360h, which enables the FDA to issue orders requiring
manufacturers to repair, refund, or replace defective devices, one subsection provides:
(d) Effect on other liability.
Compliance with an order issued under this section shall not relieve any person
from liability under Federal or State law. In awarding damages for economic
loss in an action brought for the enforcement of any such liability, the value to
the plaintiff in such action of such remedy, provided him under such order shall
be taken into account.
21 U.S.C. § 360h(d). This provision shows that Congress clearly assumed that FDA or-
ders would not preempt common-law claims. See Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp.
633, 636 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that § 360h(d) "specifically contemplates state law
liability and damages"); see also Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 929 ("[I]t is perplexing
to imagine Congress preempting requirements imposed by FDA rules, but refusing to do
so with respect to FDA orders."). It would have been nonsensical to include a subsection
precluding relief from tort liability if all common-law claims were preempted generally by
the reach of § 360k. See id. Moreover, in § 360j(a), the word "requirement" is used re-
peatedly to describe FDA-issued regulations. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(a).
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common-law tort actions.170 The legislative history is replete with
broad statements such as: "The legislation is written so that the
benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer. After all, it is
the consumer who pays with his health and his life for medical device
malfunctions., 171 Common-law tort actions were not mentioned in
any of the materials leading up to the enactment of § 360k." The
legislative history focused exclusively on difficulties created by con-
flict with positive enactments-statutes and regulations7  For
example, Congress feared that "[i]f a substantial number of differing
requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdic-
tions other than the federal government, interstate commerce would
be unduly burdened."'174
A final argument that Congress never intended § 360k to pre-
empt common-law tort claims originates from the 1995 passage of
House Bill 956; though ultimately vetoed by the President, this bill
would have eliminated punitive damages in products liability actions
against medical device manufacturers.75 If § 360k preempted com-
170. Medtronic conceded that no specific language or legislative history supported its
contention that common-law tort actions were considered "requirements." See Brief for
Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 12, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) (urging the
Court to "conclude that the statutory language mandates preemption despite the silence
of the legislative history"); Transcript of Oral Arg., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886),
available in 1996 WL 207143, at *5 (admitting that "[i]n all honesty, Justice O'Connor,
there really is almost nothing in the legislative history").
171. 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
172. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 n.13 (noting that the legislative history did not
mention common-law claims). Medtronic's response was that the failure of the legislative
history to specifically state that common-law claims were preempted was not dispositive,
as no legislative history specifically stated that common-law claims were not preempted.
See Brief for Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 11 n.10, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886). In essence, Medtronic was arguing that the burden was on the Lohrs to produce
legislative history showing that the claims were not preempted, rather than the other way
around. See id.
173. See Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 924 n.131 (discussing the legislative history
of § 360k).
174. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45 (1976). The House Report specifically mentioned a
comprehensive California statute, which required premarket approval for intrauterine
and other medical devices, as an example of a state "requirement" that would be pre-
empted by the MDA. See id.
175. See Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
§ 201(f) (1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. H2941-48 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995). The bill
was vetoed by President Clinton on May 2, 1996. See Message on Returning Without
Approval to the House of Representatives the Common Sense Product Liability Legal
Reform Act of 1996,32 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 780,780-81 (May 6,1996). The Lohrs
argued that "[tihese provisions [eliminating punitive, but not compensatory, damages]
would not merely be superfluous if the MDA had already eliminated common-law claims,
but would substantially increase the remedies available to tort victims in bills that were
intended to have precisely the opposite effect." Brief for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr
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mon-law claims, obviously no reason would exist to bar punitive
damages in such cases. However, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, resort to subsequent enactments is inappropriate when the plain
meaning of the statute is clear."' Additionally, it would not be incon-
ceivable for Congress to exclude punitive damages for a type of claim
it had previously said would be preempted." Even so, House Bill
956 demonstrates that confusion over preemption may be even more
widespread in Congress than in the courts.'78
Pursuant to its administrative authority, the FDA has promul-
gated regulations under the MDA 9 These regulations are relevant
to the preemption analysis because courts commonly defer, when in-
terpreting an ambiguous statute, to the view of the agency charged
with administering that statute.' Two provisions in particular inter-
pret § 360k's prohibition against additional or different
requirements.'' The first provision, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), elaborates
and Michael Lohr at 33 n.12, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886). The general counsel
and vice president of one pacemaker manufacturer testified against a similar tort reform
bill, apparently because he thought the industry was already sufficiently protected by the
preemption defense, and any "tort reform" could only hurt its position. See Prods. Liab.
Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 196 (1994)
(statement of William Nealon, Vice President and General Counsel of Telectronics Pac-
ing Systems); Noah, supra note 37, at S-37.
176. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118
(1980) (" 'The views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one.'" (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)));
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) ("[S]tatutes are construed by the courts
with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the passage. The interpreta-
tion placed on an existing statute by a subsequent group of Congressmen who are
promoting legislation and who are unsuccessful has no persuasive significance [in con-
struing the existing statute]."); Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1988) (characterizing the citation of subsequent legislation to con-
strue preemptive effect of earlier statutes as "anachronistic").
177. Courts have not applied § 360k uniformly. Many courts have adjudged certain
types of products liability claims over medical devices to survive the § 360k analysis. See
infra notes 203 (listing pre-Cipollone cases allowing some claims) and 260 (listing post-
Cipollone cases allowing some claims). Perhaps Congress merely wanted to ensure that
any claims that survived through the judicially created loopholes in § 360k would not give
rise to punitive damages.
178. For another example of a bill demonstrating Congress's perception that tort li-
ability for medical devices is alive and well, see Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of
1996, H.R. 3468, 104th Cong. (seeking to limit tort liability for suppliers of raw materials
used in medical devices).
179. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 800-895 (1996).
180. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837,842-45 (1984).
181. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), (d).
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on what the word "requirement" means."m State requirements sub-
ject to preemption are those defined as "having the force and effect
of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court
decision)." ' Some courts have interpreted the reference to "court
decision[s]" as a clear indication that the preemptive reach of § 360k
extends to common-law tort actions. '84
However, the second regulatory provision, § 808.1(d), leads to
the opposite conclusion. This regulation forms the basis for the
"device-specificity" requirement that the Medtronic Court held
clearly limited the scope of MDA preemption.' Section 808.1(d)
provides that:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the
Food and Drug Administration has established specific
counterpart regulations or there are other specific require-
ments applicable to a particular device under the act,
thereby making any existing divergent State or local re-
quirements applicable to the device different from, or in
addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration re-
quirements."8
Even more significantly, the regulation goes on to state that the
statute "does not preempt State or local requirements of general ap-
plicability where the purpose of the requirement relates ... to other
182. See id. § 808.1(b).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 755 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (noting that § 808.1(b) includes "court decisions" in its definition of preempted
state requirements); Reiter v. Zimmer, 830 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same).
The contrary argument is that the words "court decisions" in § 808.1(b) simply refer to
court decisions enforcing and interpreting preempted state positive enactments. As one
judge has written:
The fact that a court decision involves a medical device is not determinative of
whether that court decision constitutes a preempted state requirement; what is
determinative is whether the court decision implements a principle of general
tort law or is based on a rule or regulation aimed specifically at medical devices.
Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., concurring);
see also Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 938-39 (arguing that § 808.1(b) merely refers to
court decisions applying state positive enactments). The Medtronic Court adopted Judge
Reinhardt's approach, holding that § 808.1(b) "was intended to refer to court decisions
construing state statutes or regulations." Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
185. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
186. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d); cf. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995)
(holding that a state tort suit that would impose a design requirement on tractor-trailer
manufacturers was not preempted by a statutory preemption clause, because there was no
specific federal requirement with which a successful common-law judgment would be
inconsistent).
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products in addition to devices."'" If the device-specificity require-
ment of § 808.1(d) is binding, state common-law duties applicable to
all products would seem not to fall within the reach of the MDA pre-
emption clause."
Courts that have considered § 808.1(b) and § 808.1(d) together
have split on whether their combined effect supports or precludes
preemption of common-law tort claims.'89 However, opinion letters
written by senior FDA personnel indicate that the agency prefers the
latter approach.' In addition, Richard Cooper, former chief counsel
to the FDA, has written that "FDA has no expertise or authority for
managing systems of redress for private injuries. The value judg-
ments necessary for such management-how the scales for plaintiffs
187. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (emphasis added). The regulation gives examples of laws
of "general applicability" that would be immune from preemption: general electrical
codes, the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of fitness, and unfair trade practices.
See id.
188. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459 ("[Section] 808.1(d)(1) provides that the MDA does
not preempt laws of general applicability. State common-law is a law of general applica-
bility."); id. at 1462 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (agreeing that court decisions based upon
"generally applicable state common law, including tort law" are not preempted); Oja v.
Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Colo. 1994) (criticizing the First Circuit's de-
cision in Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1994), for "ignoring the
limitations on preemption imposed by the FDA regulations").
189. Compare Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1457 (holding that the two regulations, construed
together, reflect an understanding that the MDA does not preempt common-law tort
claims), and id. at 1462 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (same), and Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc.,
850 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same), with Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42
F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir. 1994) (arguing that § 808.1(b), which supports preemption, out-
weighs § 808.1(d)), and Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1331 (7th Cir.
1992) (same).
190. In one letter, Joseph Hile, FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs,
wrote to an attorney for the National Women's Health Network in response to a request
for an advisory opinion on whether § 360k preempted common-law claims. Hile wrote:
There is no indication in the legislative history of section 521(a) [the public law
number of § 360k] that Congress intended that the section preempt State or local
requirements respecting general enforcement, including available legal reme-
dies, or State or local statutes that only incidentally apply to devices. Rules or
requirements established by States to govern legal remedies available under the
State judicial system are not "requirements with respect to a device" within the
meaning of section 521(a) of the act.
Letter from Joseph P. Hile, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, FDA, to
Robert E. Manchester, National Women's Health Network (Mar. 8, 1984), in Brief for
Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 12 app., 13 app., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754
and 95-886). A second letter, from Joseph Sheehan, Chief of the FDA Regulations Staff,
to a Washington attorney, repeated this conclusion: "FDA believes that section 521 does
not preempt general product liability requirements." Letter from Joseph Sheehan, Chief,
Regulations Staff, FDA, to Cindy Whaley, Attorney (Feb. 2, 1987), in Brief for Cross-
Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 14 app., 14 app., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886).
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and defendants should be set up-are best left to legislatures and the
courts."19'
Even if the FDA has interpreted the MDA as not preempting
state tort remedies, the question of whether the FDA is entitled to
any judicial deference on this determination remains."n Many ap-
pellate courts, construing what they consider to be the plain language
of the statute, have simply ignored the regulations.93 The issue turns
on whether one considers the language of § 360k to be ambiguous in
the first place.' If the statute is ambiguous, the agency interpreta-
tion is entitled to deference.195 But to the extent that the statute
evidences a clear congressional purpose, any contrary agency inter-
pretation is invalid. 9
191. Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food
and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 233 (1986). The last words of
this quote beg the question whether-if the value judgments are best left to legislatures-
Congress could make FDA regulations preemptive even if the FDA itself wanted to avoid
this role. Cf. KOCH, supra note 115, § 2.48, at 115-16 ("Congress does not lose control of
its administrative programs after it passes the enabling act .... Congress has many
somewhat less direct methods for controlling administrative agencies."). But cf. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding direct legislative veto of duly taken agency
action unconstitutional). See generally McGreal, supra note 115, at 825 n.17
(distinguishing between "regulatory preemption" and "statutory preemption").
192. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that deference to agency is unwarranted when statute's plain language is
clear); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (noting that
plain wording is "best evidence" of congressional intent); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (ruling that where the lan-
guage of a statute is clear, it must be given effect by both the agency and the courts).
193. See, e.g., Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1461 n.3 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (lamenting that
most courts have given no weight to 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1)); English v. Mentor Corp., 67
F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (declaring FDA interpretation is of no value if inconsistent
with congressional will), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
194. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
195. See id.; Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353,358
(2d Cir. 1993) (reiterating the general rule that courts should defer to the agency charged
with enforcing an ambiguous statute as long as the agency's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable). In Medtronic, Justice Breyer noted that as the agency charged with en-
forcement of the FDCA, the FDA had "special understanding of the likely impact of both
state and federal requirements, as well as an understanding of whether (or the extent to
which) state requirements may interfere with federal objectives." Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at
2260 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But see Transcript
of Oral Arg., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886), available in 1996 WL 207143, at *24 ("I
thought we gave deference to those determinations that the agency has to make in the
course of the agency's implementation of a statute. Preemption has nothing to do with
the agency's implementation of a statute.").
196. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Court errs when it employs an
agency's narrowing construction of a statute when no such deference is warranted."). In
oral argument, one Justice cogently expressed the deference argument:
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Before the landmark case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,97
defendants in medical device liability cases rarely argued the preemp-
tion defense. The 1984 Fourth Circuit case of Brooks v. Medtronic,
Inc.'98 is typical. Like the Lohrs, Brooks sued Medtronic to recover
for personal injuries resulting from an allegedly defective pacemaker
lead. " The court of appeals affirmed a judgment for Medtronic, but
only after discussing in detail whether Medtronic had satisfied the
duties it owed to Brooks, the end user of its product, under state
common law.= Although the MDA, and the preemption clause
therein, were clearly in force and applicable at the time of Brooks,2 1'
nowhere in the entire opinion was there any consideration of the pre-
emption defense.2
The few courts that addressed preemption under the MDA be-
fore Cipollone tended to find that tort claims were not preempted.23
Why can't you read the statute as simply giving to the agency the power to
say, within every broad reason, which requirements do what in respect to pre-
emption? That would make the statute work.... The agency has said ...
... We are going to preempt things. Which things? Well, the agency has the
power to tell us which. That would seem a sensible thing to do, wouldn't it, and
isn't that consistent with the language, normal practice? We give lots of powers
to agencies.
Transcript of Oral Arg., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886), available in 1996 WL
207143, at *22-*23. Counsel for Medtronic responded that deference was not owed be-
cause the agency's "position ... that the scope of preemption under this provision should
be basically nonexistent, a device-specific requirement, eviscerates preemption that
clearly was not the intention of Congress in enacting a preemption provision which is
very, very, very broad." Id. at *24.
197. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). For discussion of Cipollone, see infra notes 221-56 and ac-
companying text.
198. 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984).
199. See id. at 1229.
200. See id. at 1231.
201. See id. at 1229 n.3 (noting that the FDA had just approved a new pacemaker lead
made by Medtronic).
202. Similarly, in Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987), the state court
considered and rejected A.H. Robins's argument that § 360k preempted labeling and
advertising requirements of the Kansas Food & Drug Act, on which the plaintiff was re-
lying, but did not even mention the possibility that the plaintiff's tort claim would
constitute a "requirement." See id at 1232. The novelty of the preemption defense is
illustrated by the fact that one major products liability treatise did not even add a section
on the preemption defense until after its 1988 edition. Compare 2 MADDEN, supra note
139, §§ 24.1 to .8, at 389-439 (omitting any discussion of preemption in chapter on medical
devices), with 2 id § 24.9, at 133-35 supp. (adding new chapter addressing preemption of
tort claims).
203. See, e.g., Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 668 (D. Md. 1989)
("Congress did not intend to preempt state tort law, either expressly or impliedly, when it
enacted the [MDA]."); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1300 (D.
Minn. 1988) (rejecting preemption because "tort law's effect does not conflict in such a
manner that it makes compliance with both federal and state law impossible"). Even the
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This approach was characteristic of the general judicial reluctance to
find preemption of tort claims.' Even though the MDA preempted
any state "requirement," 5 this designation was generally not under-
stood to include state common law. 6
Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co. 7 is representative of the few deci-
sions prior to Cipollone that specifically addressed preemption under
the MDA. Callan involved an injured consumer's action against the
manufacturer of an allegedly defective intra-uterine device."8 The
district court reasoned that "[t]he plain language of § 360k indicates
that Congress intended to preempt state or local legislation and ad-
ministrative regulations governing devices, not state tort law."209
Examining the legislative history, the court confirmed that Con-
gress's focus had been on "legislative and administrative 'programs'
governing the sale and distribution of devices. ,21 0  Because of the
scarcity of cases at that time dealing specifically with the MDA, the
courts finding preemption tended to apply it selectively, holding that it eliminated only
one of several causes of action, so that preemption alone did not throw the plaintiff out of
court. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243,246 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
only the plaintiff's failure-to-warn/label claim was preempted, and that misdesign and
mismanufacture claims were not preempted); Bejarno v. International Playtex, Inc., 750
F. Supp. 443, 446 (D. Idaho 1990) (holding that only the failure-to-warn claim was pre-
empted); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989) (same).
204. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Fere-
bee, the D.C. Circuit held that a section in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, providing that a state "shall not impose or continue in effect any re-
quirements for labeling ... in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter," 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994), did not preempt private tort actions under state
law. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1543. According to the court, "[i]mposition of such a dual
obligation upon a manufacturer is permissible under the Act.... Moreover, tort recovery
in a case such as this one may also promote legitimate regulatory aims." Id. at 1541. See
generally JOHN S. ALLEE, PRODUCr LIABILITY § 8.09(3), at 8-69 (1996) ("Despite the
potential for conflicting regulation by a federal agency and by courts and juries in fifty
states, courts initially were not sympathetic to preemption claims in product cases .... );
Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 903-04 (1994) (surveying the pre-Cipollone cases, which
tended not to find preemption).
205. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
206. See ALLEE, supra note 204, § 8.09(3), at 8-69 ("[C]ourts initially were not sympa-
thetic to ... [preemption arguments] that would broadly invalidate state common law
product liability laws .... "); Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 902-03 ("[T]he courts have
been particularly slow to preempt state laws relating to health and safety matters, espe-
cially tort claims, because such matters have historically been the exclusive concern of the
states." (footnotes omitted)).
207. 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989).
208. See id. at 663. The district court held that the MDA was not applicable to IUDs,
see id. at 666, but nevertheless went on to address the preemption as an alternative
ground for its holding in favor of the plaintiff, see id. at 666-68.
209. Id. at 667.
210. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45-46 (1976)).
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district court relied heavily on cases involving preemption of tort
claims under other statutes. 1  In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,21
for example, the Supreme Court had held that the Atomic Energy
Act of 195423 did not preempt punitive damages for dangerous emis-
sions even though a damage award "punishes and deters conduct
related to radiation hazards. 2 4 The Callan court cited Silkwood to
justify its reluctance to interpret a statute as removing" 'all means of
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.' ,,25 The Callan
court also drew from Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,21 6 which held
that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act's pre-
emption provision did not bar state damages actions,2 7 and from
Garrett v. Ford Motor Co.218 which held that a similar preemption
provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act did not pre-
empt common-law claims. 2 '9  The Callan court's approach is
illustrative of most courts' reluctance to find preemption of damages
actions prior to the Supreme Court's suggestion in Cipollone that
"requirement" could include common-law actions.m
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.Y' significantly changed the way
courts approached federal statutory preemption questions.m In
Cipollone, a deceased smoker's executor sued cigarette manufactur-
ers, claiming that they had breached express warranties, failed to
adequately warn about the hazards of smoking, and fraudulently mis-
represented those hazards to the public.m  The manufacturers
211. See id. at 667-68.
212. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
213. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2011 to 2297g-4 (West Supp. 1996)).
214. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249.
215. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 667 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251).
216. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cited in Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 668.
217. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542.
218. 684 F. Supp. 407 (D. Md. 1987), cited in Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 668.
219. See Garrett, 684 F. Supp. at 409-10.
220. See generally Marilyn P. Westerfield, Comment, Federal Preemption and the
FDA: What Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 263, 270-71 (1989) (discussing the
judicial tendency against preemption in pre-Cipollone context).
221. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion).
222. See Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 904 ("A number of courts in the 1990s ap-
pear to view the 1992 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group as
a green light to find preemption in product liability claims, particularly with respect to
medical devices."); cf. Mary Pat Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express Federal Preemption:
Where Is It After Cipollone?, 1992 DEF. COUNS. J. 491, 498-99 (arguing, shortly after
Cipollone was decided, that the Court's admonition that federal preemption provisions
should generally be construed narrowly made Cipollone unfavorable for manufacturers).
223. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 508.
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contended that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act and its
predecessor statute, both of which regulated the labeling of ciga-
rettes, protected them from liability by preempting any different or
additional state requirements.' As a preliminary matter, the Cipol-
lone plurality noted that there is a "presumption against the pre-
emption of state police power regulations."'  Notwithstanding this
presumption, after closely examining the language of the two stat-
utes, the Court concluded that while the 1965 act preempted only
positive enactments,2 the 1969 act-which referred specifically to
"requirement[s]"-preempted common-law tort actions as well as
positive enactments.' The Court also set forth the guiding test:
"[W]e ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the com-
mon-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with re-
spect to ... advertising or promotion.' "'
Under this test, the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims were al-
lowed only to the extent that they sought liability for failure to label
merely as required by federal regulations. 9 The Cipollone plurality
next considered the plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim, and
found that the private, voluntary nature of contractual duties distin-
224. See &L at 510. The two statutes were the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-40 (1994)), and the act superseding it, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40).
The first act provided that "[n]o statement relating to smoking and health shall be re-
quired in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act." Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965,
§ 5(b), 79 Stat. at 283 (superseded by 1969 act). The second act refined § 5(b) to read:
"No requirement or prohibition based on smoking or health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter." Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, § 2(b), 84 Stat. at 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). The later act
is of primary relevance because its language is closer to the language of the MDA.
225. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518.
226. See id at 518-19. The Court explained that the phrase "'[n]o statement relating
to smoking and health' . . . referred to the sort of warning provided for in § 4 [of the fed-
eral act itself] .... Thus, on their face, these provisions merely prohibited state and
federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements on cigarette
labels ... ." Id at 518 (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965,
§ 5(a)).
227. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522-23 ("[T]he 1965 version of § 5 was precise and nar-
row on its face; the obviously broader language of the 1969 version extended that
section's pre-emptive reach.").
228. Id at 524 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 2(b)). The
Court noted that each phrase within the test "limits the universe of common-law claims
pre-empted by the statute." Id.
229. See iL
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guished them from duties imposed by tort law. The plurality thus
concluded that breach of express warranty claims were not pre-
empted."
Finally, the Cipollone plurality applied the preemption provision
of the cigarette labeling act to the plaintiff's theory of fraudulent mis-
representation. 2  Part of the plaintiff's fraud claim was that the
manufacturer's advertising neutralized the effect of health hazard
warnings. 3 The Court saw this claim as "merely the converse of a
state-law requirement that warnings be included in advertising and
promotional materials"; it simply duplicated the preempted failure-
to-warn claim.' Thus, this part of the fraud claim was preempted.
The second part of the fraud claim was that the manufacturer had
made false statements concerning its product, or concealed material
230. See id. at 525-26 & n.23; cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-
26 (1995) (holding that the Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt plaintiff's common-
law contract claims). In Medtronic, the breach of warranty claim apparently was dis-
missed at a very early stage. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248. Had a breach of express
warranty claim been at issue, Medtronic's argument for preemption would have been
weaker than its argument for preemption of the Lohrs' other claims, because of the hold-
ing in Cipollone that "a common-law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily
undertaken should not be regarded as a 'requirement ... imposed under State law'.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 2(b)).
231. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 526-27. This conclusion was a source of major disa-
greement on the Court. Justice Scalia emphatically disagreed with the plurality. See id. at
551 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). According to Justice
Scalia, "[flor the making of a voluntary promise or representation, no less than for the
commission of an intentional tort, it is the background law against which the act occurs,
and not the act itself, that supplies the element of legal obligation." Id. (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia noted that the Cipollone
plurality's preemption of express warranty analysis was inconsistent with its observation,
in another context, that" '[a] contract has no legal force apart from the law that acknowl-
edges its binding character.'" Id. at 551-52 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 130
(1991) (alteration in original)).
It is worth noting that Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Cipollone on the grounds
that none of the plaintiff's claims should have been preempted, noted analytical inconsis-
tencies within the plurality's conclusion that breach of warranty claims were not
preempted. See id. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("[A]bsent the State's decision to penalize such behavior
through the creation of a common-law damages action, no warranty claim would exist.").
Even though he supported the end result of non-preemption, Justice Blackmun cited the
plurality's argument about express warranties as one example of the many contradictions
in its analysis. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
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facts. 5 This part of the claim was not preempted, because "[s]uch
claims are predicated not on a duty 'based on smoking or health' but
rather on a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive. '" 6
The Cipollone plurality's approach to preemption was charac-
terized by a close textual reading of the express preemption
provision, and by compartmentalized claim-by-claim analysis of what
requirements, if any, would be created by each particular claim under
state law."7 While this analysis is theoretically sound, in practice it
created a "hodgepodge of allowed and disallowed claims."' 8 By de-
clining to take a categorical approach, the Court made its ruling
largely contingent on semantic distinctions that lower courts would
find difficult to recognize and address consistently.
39
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter, argued that none of the plaintiff's claims were
preempted."' Justice Blackmun called the plurality's analysis a
"compromise position.""24 He emphasized that preemption can be
found only when there is "clear and unambiguous evidence that Con-
235. See iii at 528.
236. Id. at 528-29 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 2(b), Pub.
L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)). The plurality went
on to note that nonpreemption of intentional fraud was consistent with the legislative
intent behind the statute. See id. The expressly stated purpose, in part, was to relieve
manufacturers of the burden of complying with "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing ciga-
rette labeling and advertising regulations." 15 U.S.C. § 1331. The plurality observed that
state law prohibitions against fraud were uniform, unlike the variant requirements con-
cerning product warnings. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529. Thus, it did no harm to the
purpose of the statute to allow these claims to survive preemption. See id The Court
briefly mentioned one related claim, dealing with conspiracy to misrepresent facts, and
concluded that it was not preempted under the same analysis applicable to the basic fraud
claim. See id. at 530.
237. See Benz & Meyer, supra note 222, at 493-94 (discussing the Cipollone Court's
method of analysis).
238. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
239. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (arguing that there was "no principled basis for many of the plurality's
asserted distinctions among the common-law claims"); id at 543-44 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("I can only
speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in attempting to implement to-
day's decision."); Benz & Meyer, supra note 222, at 491 (asserting that by "craft[ing] a
compromise between the positions of the two camps," the Court "adopted a preemption
standard under the 1969 act too malleable for the trial courts to apply consistently").
240. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
241. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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gress intended that result," 42 and there was no such evidence in the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act.243 Justice Blackmun took issue
with the plurality's conclusion that the term "requirement" included
common-law actions as well as positive enactments.244 He also ex-
amined the legislative history of the cigarette labeling statutes and
found that Congress did not intend to preempt common-law claims.' 5
The theme that injured plaintiffs should never be left without any
form of redress-a theme which also surfaced in Medtronic2 -
resonated throughout Justice Blackmun's dissent. 47 Justice Black-
242. Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). The plurality agreed with this proposition. See id. at 516
("Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] ...
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947))).
243. See id. at 535-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("The dictionary definitions of these terms [used in the Act]
suggest, if anything, specific actions mandated or disallowed by a formal governing
authority.").
244. See id. at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun argued that a key distinction exists be-
tween common-law actions and positive enactments: "The effect of tort law on a
manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect... . The level of choice that a defendant
retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the
common-law from positive enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations."
Id. at 536-37 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
245. See id. at 540 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (noting that common-law damages actions were conspicu-
ously absent from a list of "requirements" that the Senate Report said would be
preempted (quoting S. REP. No. 91-566, at 12 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2652, 2663)); id. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (finding "absolutely no suggestion in the legislative history
that Congress intended to leave plaintiffs who were injured ... without any alternative
remedies"). The quoted Senate Report stated that "this preemption is intended to in-
clude not only action by State statute but by all other administrative actions or local
ordinances or regulations by any political subdivision of any State." S. REP. No. 91-566,
at 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2663.
Justice Blackmun's emphasis on the lack of references to common-law actions in the
legislative history parallels the Medtronic plurality's exegesis of the MDA. See, e.g.,
Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 ("If Congress intended [preemption of tort claims], its fail-
ure even to hint at it is spectacularly odd, particularly since Members of both Houses
were acutely aware of ongoing product liability litigation."). See infra notes 290-92 and
accompanying text (arguing that the Medtronic plurality's attempted distinction from
Cipollone on the grounds the legislative histories of the two statutes are different is prob-
lematic because in neither legislative history is there any mention of common-law claims).
246. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 (doubting that "Congress would have barred
most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective medical devices").
247. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). It is not clear how relevant the "leaving plain-
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mun concluded by "[s]tepping back from the specifics" to look at the
general analytical framework that the plurality had concocted.2 48 By
establishing an unnecessarily complicated "crazy quilt" of preemp-
tion, he claimed, the plurality contorted the clear, simple language of
the preemption clauses.24 According to Justice Blackmun, the plu-
rality frequently and arbitrarily altered the level of generality at
which it examined each claim." Lower courts undoubtedly would
not be equipped to administer this framework in a uniform manner."
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, was equally
critical of the plurality's opinion, but reached a diametrically oppo-
site result than that of Justice Blackmun. Justice Scalia first took
issue with the plurality's preference for narrow construction of pre-
tiffs without redress" argument actually was in Cipollone, since under the plurality's
opinion, several of the plaintiff's alternate grounds for relief survived the preemption
analysis. See ik at 530-31 (holding that claims based on express warranty, intentional
fraud and misrepresentation, and conspiracy survived as to the 1969 statute, and all claims
survived as to the 1965 statute). The same situation occurred in Medtronic-even if the
dissenters had prevailed, the Lohrs would have had at least some available claims re-
maining against the manufacturer. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that defective design claims were not
preempted by the cursory section 510(k) process, and that tort claims alleging violation of
federal standards are never preempted); see also infra notes 302-17 (arguing that even if
the Medtronic dissenters had prevailed, plaintiffs would not be stripped of all remedies for
defective medical devices). But cf King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that all of the plaintiffs claims for injury from an anti-wrinkle skin
cream were preempted by the MDA).
Justice Blackmun in Cipollone, and the plurality in Medtronic, both relied on Silk-
wood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984). See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251
(citing Silkwood for the proposition that statutes should not be interpreted to leave per-
sons injured by illegal conduct without any means of judicial recourse); Cipollone, 505
U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (citing the same proposition from Silkwood).
248. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
249. See il at 542-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
250. See id. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun gave the following example of this incon-
sistency. When analyzing failure-to-warn claims, the plurality held that they were
preempted, because they were "based on smoking or health." See id. at 529. Yet when
analyzing fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the plurality held that they were not pre-
empted, because they were based on the general duty not to deceive. See id. Justice
Blackmun asserted that the plurality had arbitrarily labeled each claim as "based on
smoking or health" or not, without any underlying common rationale. See id. at 543
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
251. See id. at 543-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
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emption statutes,22 asserting that ordinary principles of statutory con-
struction should apply instead. 3 The logical result of the plurality's
general arguments about preemption was that ambiguously drafted
preemption clauses would always fall in favor of state power.' Jus-
tice Scalia briefly noted his agreement with the plurality that a state
tort claim imposes a "requirement" within the meaning of the pre-
emption clause in the cigarette labeling statute, but argued that the
statute preempted all of Cipollone's claims, not just some of them. 5
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia regretted the inconsistency,
lack of clarity, and general patchwork approach of the plurality
opinion."
252. See id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 518 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e must construe these provisions in light
of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations.").
253. See id. at 545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
254. See id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia attacked the plurality's position as creating a situation in which
[t]he statute that says anything about pre-emption must say everything; and it
must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity concerning its scope will be
read in favor of preserving state power. If this is to be the law, surely only the
most sporting of congresses will dare to say anything about pre-emption.
Id. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Although
one might expect Justice Scalia to be a vigorous supporter of state and local autonomy,
commentators have noted that his commitment to states' rights has been somewhat lack-
ing. See Stewart Abercrombie Baker & Katherine H. Wheatley, Justice Scalia and
Federalism: A Sketch, 20 URB. LAW. 353, 353 (1988) (stating that despite his reputation
as a conservative idealogue, Justice Scalia's track record on federalism issues has been
"disappointing"); id. at 364 ("Of the fourteen cases raising the [preemption] issue, Justice
Scalia voted to preempt state law in eight.... [F]ive [of those] involved federal laws that
were arguably more conservative than state law."); Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 36, at
1443, 1456 (contrasting Justice O'Connor, a staunch advocate of federalism, with Justice
Scalia, whose advocacy of federalism is a mere "byproduct" of his textual-historical
methodology). For a discussion of the federalism implications of MDA preemption, see
infra notes 322-34 and accompanying text.
255. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia argued that the claim for breach of express war-
ranty was preempted because "[w]hen liability attaches to a particular promise or
representation, it attaches by law." Id. at 551 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). As for the fraud claim, Justice Scalia would have ignored the
source of the duty (i.e., whether its origin was "based on smoking and health") and in-
stead applied a "proximate application" methodology, which would inquire whether the
duty would impose an obligation in this case because of the effect of smoking upon health.
See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
256. See id. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia found an inconsistency between what the Court said (that preemp-
tion clauses should be construed narrowly) and what the Court did (applied the
preemption clauses to preempt at least some of the plaintiff's claims). See id. at 555
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality's re-
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Almost immediately after Cipollone was decided, the preemp-
tion theory permeated tort-claim cases in the lower courts, which
began to read Cipollone as compelling preemption in a wide variety
of circumstancesY Most courts assumed, with little analysis, that
because the Supreme Court read the term "requirement" to include
common law under the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, it fol-
lowed a fortiori that "requirement" under the MDA also
incorporated state common law."8 Justice Blackmun's prediction of a
"hodgepodge of allowed and disallowed claims"' 9 proved prophetic
as the courts of appeals began to apply the difficult claim-by-claim
Cipollone test in the MDA context.20
Michael v. Shiley, Inc. 1 was typical of the inconsistency gener-
ated by Cipollone. In Shiley, the plaintiff received a defective
artificial heart valve manufactured by Shiley, and brought claims for
negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied and express war-
ranty. '2 The Third Circuit first held that the negligence and strict
liability claims were automatically preempted under an analysis that
it had adopted in an earlier case. 3 The court distinguished between
implied warranty, which establishes inherent, state-imposed require-
ments and thus is preempted, and express warranty, in which the
parties themselves define their obligations.2 4 The mere enforcement
sponse to Justice Scalia's charge was that "our ambition here is not theoretical elegance."
Id. at 529 n.27.
257. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 1994) (relying
solely on Cipollone to refute plaintiff's argument against MDA preemption). See gener-
ally Noah, supra note 37, at S-37 ("Cipollone, it seemed, put the 'holy grail' of pre-
emption within the reach of product manufacturers in a variety of other industries.").
258. See, e.g., Gile, 22 F.3d at 542 (holding that the meaning of "requirement" in
Cipollone could be transferred to the MDA context).
259. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 543 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
260. See, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding all
claims except express warranty preempted), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575
(1996); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 435-38 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling failure-to-warn
claim preempted; misdesign claim not preempted), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575
(1996); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (judging that all
of the plaintiff's claims were preempted); Gile, 22 F.3d at 546 (same); Stamps v. Collagen
Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,
1137 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 269,274 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(same), vacated and remanded, 91 F.3d 143 (6th Cir. 1996). But see Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that state common-law is never pre-
empted by the MDA).
261. 46 F.3d 1316 (3rd Cir. 1995).
262. See id. at 1319.
263. See id. at 1324 (citing Gile, 22 F.3d at 543-44).
264. See id. at 1324-26; cf. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-26
(1995) (ruling that Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt plaintiff's common-law con-
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of a private contractual agreement (i.e., express warranty) by state
courts was not preempted by the MDA.265 Also, to the extent that the
plaintiff's express warranty claim would merely enforce the very lan-
guage that the FDA had required for the Shiley valve, it would not
constitute a different or additional requirement. 66 Thus the breach of
express warranty claim survived.267 However, all of the plaintiff's
other claims were preempted.u8
As Shiley indicated, the judicial climate definitely favored pre-
emption of tort claims under the MDA after Cipollone.29 The Ninth
Circuit was the only court of appeals to stray from the predominant
approach of finding preemption under the MDA. In Kennedy v.
Collagen Corp.,2 0 the Ninth Circuit commented: "While most courts
have found that at least some, if not all, state common law claims are
preempted by the MDA, these courts have failed to devote any atten-
tion to the meaning of 'general applicability' within the context of the
MDA and its accompanying regulations." 27' The Ninth Circuit gave
substantial credence to the applicable FDA regulations in its con-
struction of the Amendments, and found that the MDA did not
preempt state common-law claims.2 2 However, the Kennedy ap-
tract claim).
265. See Shiley, 46 F.3d at 1325-26.
266. See iL at 1328 ("[T]he resulting liability does not differ from or add to FDA
regulation. Rather it supports the FDA's approval by giving it effect."); cf. Medtronic,
116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Where a
state cause of action seeks to enforce an FDCA requirement, that claim does not impose
a requirement that is 'different from, or in addition to' requirements under federal law."
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (1994))).
267. See Shiley, 46 F.3d at 1328; see also supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text
(noting similar outcome in Cipollone).
268. See Shiley, 46 F.3d at 1324-25.
269. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), which involved
express statutory preemption of tort claims in a non-products liability context, a seven-
Justice majority of the Court cited Cipollone for the proposition that "[1]egal duties im-
posed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of [a preemption clause that
precluded inconsistent laws, rules, regulations, orders, or standards]." Id. at 664. This
seven-Justice majority included Justices Blackmun and Kennedy, who had said one year
before in Cipollone that common law was not a "requirement" preempted by the cigarette
labeling act. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,536 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The
Easterwood Court's confident use of Cipollone suggests that it viewed Cipollone as settled
law.
270. 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
271. Id. at 1458 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1995)). Section 808.1(d)(1) provides
that the MDA "does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability."
See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (explaining the FDA regulations).
272. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1457. Pursuant to Chevron, the Ninth Circuit gave defer-
ence to the FDA's interpretation of the MDA. See id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
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proach was the minority. Most courts held that 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
preempted at least some of the plaintiff's claims, and several courts
held that all common-law claims were preempted.2'
Because of the intricate nature of the questions decided, Med-
tronic, Inc. v. Lohr defies simple analysis. Certain aspects of the
decision merit critical exploration. One key issue is the extent to
which the Medtronic opinion is compatible with Cipollone."4 An-
other is the degree of ideological separation between the plurality
and dissenters. 275 An understanding of where the Justices were on
common ground is essential to an informed prediction of how they
will align on future tort-claim preemption issues." A third area for
exploration involves the irony that the same Justices who are usually
adamant about states' rights voted in Medtronic to deny state courts
the right to hear certain claims brought by injured citizens.2' The
fourth issue is probably the most important for practitioners: What
does the future hold for products liability preemption, both within
and outside the medical device context?278
On the surface, Cipollone and Medtronic seem to be incompati-
ble.279 During the Medtronic litigation, Medtronic naturally relied on
Cipollone to support its theory that common-law tort claims impose
requirements subject to preemption. After all, in Cipollone, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that it is
proper to defer on an ambiguous statutory provision to the agency charged with enforcing
that statute); cf Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) ("[I]n the absence of a clear congressional command as to pre-
emption, courts may infer that the relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of
leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or administrative actions will have pre-
emptive effect.").
273. See supra note 260 (citing post-Cipollone cases).
274. See infra notes 279-301 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 302-21 and accompanying text.
276. Cf. Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 36, at 1445 ("[A]nalyses of the substantive and
methodological differences among [past] Justices... have become more significant than
studies of their shared perspective. A parallel analysis of the differences, as well as the
similarities... on the current Supreme Court can also be quite interesting and instruc-
tive."). See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 221 (1992) (discussing the role that individual Justices'
values play in determining outcomes); idt at 274-76 (describing how coalitions are formed
on the Court).
277. See infra notes 322-34 and accompanying text.
278. See infra notes 333-61 and accompanying text.
279. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("The plurality's reasons for departing from [Cipollone] are neither clear nor
persuasive. It fails to refute the applicability of the reasoning of Cipollone.").
280. See Brief for Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 10, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754
and 95-886) ("There is no principled distinction between the terms of the FDCA and the
language of the Cigarette Act at issue in Cipollone .... ).
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Court interpreted the word "requirement" to include common-law
tort claims, and found that most of the plaintiff's claims were pre-
empted2' Yet in Medtronic, the Court interpreted the word
"requirement" not to include common-law tort claims, and found
that none of the plaintiff's claims were preempted.'
However, Medtronic is not a complete reversal of the Cipollone
doctrine. Unlike Justice Blackmun's Cipollone dissent, the plurality
in Medtronic did not state that "requirement" could never include a
common-law action.' Instead, they focused on whether § 360k pre-
empted the particular claims at issue.' Thus, at least theoretically,
Cipollone and Medtronic can be reconciled by the Medtronic plural-
ity's unwillingness to rule out the possibility that language prohibiting
"any requirement" could have preemptive effect in another case.
Nevertheless, the plurality's conclusion in Medtronic that the
tort claims were not preempted is ironic. It is especially striking that
Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinions in both Cipollone and
Medtronic, construing the word "requirement" in different ways in
each opinion.' Conscious of the apparent inconsistency, Justice Ste-
vens sought in Medtronic to distinguish the MDA from the Public
281. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,521,530-31 (1992).
282. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251-52,2258.
283. Compare id. at 2258 (declining to rule that the meaning of the term
"requirement" is not inherently limited to positive enactments), and id. at 2259 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("One can reasonably read the
word 'requirement' as including the legal requirements that grow out of the application,
in particular circumstances, of a State's tort law."), with Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 536
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) ("Although an award of damages by its very nature attaches additional conse-
quences to the manufacturer's continued unlawful conduct, no particular course of action
(e.g., the adoption of a new warning label) is required.").
284. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259; cf. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 670 (1993) ("Examination of these [railroad safety warning] regulations demon-
strates that, when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted. However, petitioner
has failed to establish that the regulations apply to these cases, and hence we find respon-
dent's grade crossing claim is not pre-empted.").
285. Compare Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 ("The phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibi-
tion' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form
of common-law rules."), with Medtronie, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 ("[Ilf Congress intended to
preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a singularly odd word with which to do
it."). In Cipollone, Justice Stevens implied that in order to determine that "requirement"
includes tort law, one need look no further than "the plain words of the [statute and] the
general understanding of common-law damages actions." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521; cf.
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 233 (1974) ("Ordinarily, the same words used in different stat-
utes on the same subject are interpreted to have the same meaning."). But cf. Jarecki v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (suggesting that the same word in different
statutes can have varying meanings due to differences in context)..
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Health Cigarette Smoking Act at issue in Cipollone.2" The cigarette
act was targeted at a limited area of regulation-labeling and adver-
tising-so that the word "requirement" could be construed broadly
within that context.27 On the other hand, in Medtronic, a broad and
"sweeping interpretation of the statute would require far greater in-
terference with state legal remedies."'  The essence of Justice
Stevens's argument in Medtronic seemed to be that preemption of
"any requirement" includes preemption of common-law claims if the
underlying statute is narrowly focused, but not if the underlying stat-
ute has broad effects. This argument is inconsistent with the Court's
prior admonitions that where an express preemption clause is con-
cerned, Congress's intent as to that specific provision is paramount,
regardless of the scope of the surrounding statute."'
Another distinction Justice Stevens made was that "[o]ther dif-
ferences between this statute and the one in Cipollone further
convince [the Court] that when Congress enacted § 360k, it was pri-
marily concerned with the problem of specific, conflicting State
statutes and regulations rather than the general duties enforced by
common-law actions."2' He cited evidence of this "primary concern"
in the legislative history of the MDA.29' However, Justice Stevens's
failure to show that Congress was any less preoccupied with conflict-
286. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252.
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. In Cipollone, the Court stated:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the
enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that
provision provides a "reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority," "there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state
laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505
(1978) and California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,282 (1987)).
290. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252. Comparing the MDA to the cigarette labeling stat-
utes at issue in Cipollone, Justice Stevens argued, "giving the term 'requirement' its
widest reasonable meaning did not have nearly the pre-emptive scope nor the effect on
potential remedies [in Cipollone] that Medtronic's broad reading of the term would have
in this case." Id.
291. See id. at 2252-53. The legislative history contained only references to burden-
some state positive enactments. See id. at 2253 (citing 122 CONG. REc. 5850, 5855
(1976)). Justice Stevens stated that "nowhere in the materials relating to the Act's his-
tory have we discovered a reference to a fear that product liability actions would hamper
the development of medical devices." Id. Justice Stevens also distinguished the MDA on
the grounds that the word "requirement" was used elsewhere in the MDA, and even
elsewhere within § 360k, to refer indisputably to positive enactments. See id. at 2252; see
also supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing the general use of the word
"requirement" in the MDA).
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ing positive enactments when it passed the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act than it was when it passed the MDA detracted from
this attempted distinction.292
Justice Stevens's third distinction between Medtronic and
Cipollone was more convincing. "Unlike the statute construed in
Cipollone," Justice Stevens reasoned, "pre-emption under the MDA
does not arise directly as a result of the enactment of the statute;
rather, in most cases a state law will be pre-empted only to the extent
that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal 'requirement.' ,,293
This distinction laid the foundation for the high deference that Jus-
tice Stevens granted to the FDA's interpretation of preemption.294
The statute in Cipollone set forth self-executing requirements for la-
beling cigarette packages, instead of delegating this responsibility to
* 21
an agency.29 In contrast, the MDA is an enabling act, authorizing the
FDA to implement regulations that carry out the substantive purpose
of the statute.296 Based on Justice Stevens's reasoning, Cipollone
might have come out differently if (1) Congress had delegated the
responsibility to issue cigarette labeling requirements to an agency;
292. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253. In fact, the Cipollone Court observed that
"portions of the legislative history of the 1969 Act suggest that Congress was primarily
concerned with positive enactments by States and localities." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (expressing goal of cigarette labeling statute that
"commerce and the national economy may be ... not impeded by diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing cigarette labeling advertising regulations" (emphasis added)), with H.R.
REP. No. 94-853, at 45 (1976) ("[Ilf a substantial number of differing requirements appli-
cable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal government,
interstate commerce would be unduly burdened.... In the absence of effective Federal
regulation of medical device, some States have established their own programs.").
293. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255. Earlier in the opinion, as an aside to another argu-
ment, Justice Stevens explained the nature of this distinction:
Unlike § 360k, the pre-emptive effect of the statute in Cipollone was not de-
pendent on the issuance of any agency regulations. The territory exclusively
occupied by federal law was defined in the text of the statute itself; that text
specified the precise warning to smokers that Congress deemed both necessary
and sufficient. In the MDA, no such specifics exist until the FDA provides them.
Id. at 2252 n.9 (emphasis added).
294. See id. at 2255. Moreover, deference to agency interpretation was Justice
Breyer's primary reason for concurring with the plurality. See id. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on the FDA regulations); see
also supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Breyer's reasoning).
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994).
296. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994) (vesting Secretary of Health and Human Services
with "[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement" of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act); id § 393 (making FDA fully responsible for administer-
ing the MDA); 1 O'REILLY, supra note 11, § 2.01, at 2-1 to 2-4 (explaining congressional
delegation of authority to FDA).
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and (2) that agency had chosen not to preempt broadly.217
Even if there are valid explanations for Justice Stevens's strained
reconciliation of Medtronic and Cipollone, the Court frustrated rea-
sonable expectations by treating the two near-identical preemption
statutes differently.298 It was not unreasonable for Medtronic to be-
lieve that, based on the way the word "requirement" had been
interpreted in Cipollone, the Court three years later would rule in its
favor.2 Yet Medtronic cannot be described properly as an overruling
of Cipollone. The plurality cited Cipollone frequently, always distin-
guishing it on factual grounds rather than criticizing the Cipollone
Court's reasoning.' In the end, the most accurate statement of how
Medtronic affects Cipollone is that it reaffirms the basic Cipollone
methodology for analyzing tort claim preemption issues, but repudi-
ates the widespread perception that preemption was a foregone
conclusion after Cipollone 1
297. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255 ("Congress has given the FDA a unique role in
determining the scope of § 360k's pre-emptive effect."). If the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act had similarly delegated substantial enforcement responsibilities to an
agency, that agency's interpretation would merit Chevron deference. See id. at 2255-56;
see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (holding that deference to agency charged with enforcing ambiguous stat-
ute is appropriate); TRIBE, supra note 115, § 6.28, at 501-08 (suggesting that the existence
of an administrative agency within a statutory scheme may make statutory preemption
more likely). See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism,
and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Pir. L. REV.
607, 661-65 (1985) (discussing agency ability to preempt state law via regulations).
298. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Court discussed the
reliance interest of litigants, which is one justification for the doctrine of stare decisis:
The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a rule's repudiation as it would fall
on those who have relied reasonably on the rule's continued application....
[T]he classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of the earlier rule occurs
in the commercial context, where advance planning of great precision is most
obviously a necessity ....
Id. at 855-56 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)); see also NLRB v.
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that have accu-
mulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms."); ef. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115
(1939) ("[W]e adhere to the familiar rule that where words are employed in an act which
had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are used in that sense unless the
context requires the contrary.").
299. See Brief for Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 6, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886) ("Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Cipollone, but ultimately they merely re-argue
issues the Court already has resolved against them."). For citations to the numerous post-
Cipollone cases mostly supporting Medtronic's argument about the word "requirement,"
see supra note 260.
300. See, e.g., Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250,2251,2252,2255.
301. The Court may have felt that it was necessary to correct the pervasive misinter-
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The internal division on the Court suggested by the multiple
opinions in Medtronic is probably not as drastic as it appears. Four
dissenting Justices came out strongly in favor of preemption.m How-
ever, even if the Medtronic dissenters had won, the decision would
not have been the death knell of products liability for medical devices
covered by the MDA."3 The dramatic connotation of the five-to-four
split probably exaggerates the true degree of controversy between
the two blocs, as the dissenters took care to note that under their
analysis, two crucial types of claims would survive the preemption
analysis.'
First, the dissenters maintained that state causes of action which
simply seek to enforce existing federal requirements are not pre-
empted.f5 Justice O'Connor's approval of tort actions brought by
pretations of Cipollone in the lower courts. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 253-54 (1991) (discussing
reasons why the Supreme Court grants certiorari-for example, because "[c]larification of
a rule of evidence or some administrative procedure may be crucial ... [to resolve] confu-
sion [which] has usually been generated by conflicting or improper interpretations by
courts."); cf. T.R. VAN GEEL, UNDERSTANDING SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 94-103
(1997) (describing how the Court methodically "narrows the implications" of a disfavored
precedent as an alternative to directly overruling that precedent).
302. The same four Justices who dissented in Medtronic (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas) also supported preemption in Cipollone. Justice O'Connor and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined in the Cipollone plurality opinion, finding preemption of some but
not all of the plaintiff's claims. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 507
(1992). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued for preemption of all of the
plaintiff's claims. See id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). The positions of these four Justices, unlike that of Justice Stevens, see
supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text, are thus consistent throughout the cases.
303. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (agreeing with the plurality that the Lohrs' design claim, and claims alleging vio-
lation of federal requirements, were not preempted).
304. See id. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305. See id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Prior to
Medtronic, several cases in the federal courts of appeals had held such claims were pre-
empted. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
plaintiff's claims based on violations of MDA were preempted); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46
F.3d 1316, 1328-29 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 307 (5th
Cir. 1995) (same); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1137 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); cf
National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 993-94 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that state-law tort claims alleging failure to comply with FDA regulations are not
always preempted, but to the extent that medical device manufacturer has met FDA
regulations, such claims are preempted). The court of appeals in Medtronic had held,
citing the foregoing authority, that "preemption under the MDA cannot be defeated by a
common-law suit alleging a violation of the statutory standards." Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
56 F.3d 1335, 1343 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996). However, the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court rejected Medtronic's argu-
ments that "[s]tate requirements 'add to' federal requirements by imposing another set of
substantive rules, even if the content of both sets of rules is the same," Brief for Cross-
Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 41, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886), and that "[iut is
1486 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
plaintiffs for noncompliance with federal regulations undermines one
of the plurality's key premises-that MDA preemption of tort claims
would leave injured consumers without a remedy. 6  Justice
O'Connor's allowance of claims alleging violation of federal stan-
dards disarms the plurality's parade of horribles about preemption
"'remov[ing] all means of judicial recourse for those injured by ille-
gal conduct.' "" In essence, Justice O'Connor reduced MDA
preemption to the familiar "government standards" defense-that
government regulations conclusively define the standard of care for
the negligence calculus."8 Nonetheless, this concession seems incon-
sistent with Justice O'Connor's opinion as a whole."9 After all, even
most unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of federal norms
but to allow states to permit such private enforcement of identical norms under state
law," id. at 43. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
306. Compare Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("Where a state cause of action seeks to enforce an FDCA requirement,
that claim does not impose a requirement that is 'different from, or in addition to' re-
quirements under federal law."), with id at 2251 ("[B]ecause there is no explicit private
cause of action against manufacturers contained in the MDA, and no suggestion that the
Act created an implied private right of action, Congress would have barred most, if not
all, relief for persons injured by defective medical devices.").
307. Id. at 2251 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,251 (1984)).
308. See generally Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims As
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 949-50 (1996)
(comparing preemption and the traditional compliance with government standards de-
fense). Professor Noah wrote, just months before Medtronic:
[L]ower courts have misinterpreted Cipollone by finding broad preemption of
tort claims under other federal safety statutes when the Supreme Court really
had nothing more than the "government standards" defense in mind, a defense
that would absolve a company of liability only upon a showing of compliance
with a relevant safety requirement.
Id. at 905. "Under this view, preemption does not foreclose the availability of compensa-
tory damages for personal injury or other common-law remedies, but it does mean that
federal regulatory standards will trump common-law standards such as the general duty of
care under negligence." Id. at 949; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 8 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) ("Where such preemption is found as a matter of
law, liability cannot attach when the manufacturer has complied with the applicable
regulatory standard."); see also Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal
Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144,
1154 (1985) ("One advantage of state incorporation of federal law is that it allows the
creation of supplemental private remedies that serve the dual purpose of compensation
and deterrence, thereby reinforcing a comprehensive federal remedial scheme."); cf.
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 19 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that "[o]ne way to
ensure that a factfinder applies a standard not adding to or differing from FDA regula-
tions is to supplant the common law standard with FDA's requirements," but rejecting
this view as inconsistent with congressional intent).
309. Under Justice O'Connor's own premises, the distinction justifying state causes of
action alleging federal violations is not convincing. If the controlling inquiry is whether
state claim "recognition would impose 'any requirement' different from, or in addition to,
FDCA requirements applicable to the device," Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263 (O'Connor,
PATCHING THE "CRAZY QUILT"
if the underlying substantive "requirement" would be the same, the
penalty for noncompliance under state tort law might vary widely
from the specific penalty established by the FDA.31 Moreover, the
MDA purposefully delegates responsibility for judging compliance
with federal regulations to the FDA, not to juries."
Second, the dissenters agreed with the Court that defective de-
sign claims were not preempted by the section 510(k) "substantial
equivalency" process.312 Because the section 510(k) process applies to
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it is not clear why preemption would not bar
a common-law action, which would impose an additional requirement, simply because
that additional requirement happened to incorporate the substance of a requirement un-
der the MDA.
310. The penalty for noncompliance is what gives rise to the "requirement" in the first
place. See id at 2262 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (" 'The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of gov-
erning conduct and controlling policy.'" (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,247 (1959)). The magnitude of damages can decisively determine
the effectiveness of the rules of conduct that the awards seek to enforce. See PETERS,
supra note 2, at 1 ("In corporate planning, the projected dollar liability of some product
lines has become sufficiently important for corporate divisions to be severely restricted in
their new product plans."). Justice O'Connor recognized this possibility, see Medtronic,
116 S. Ct. at 2264 ("To be sure, the threat of a damages remedy will give manufacturers
an additional cause to comply .... "), but did not carry it to its logical conclusion-that
allowing tort liability to supplement direct regulation imposes a unique, hybrid set of end
incentives on manufacturers regarding the development of medical devices. See Brief for
Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc. at 41, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) ("[T]he
requirement to pay compensatory damages for a violation of standards identical to the
federal standards [is] a requirement that federal law does not impose."); id. at 41 n.39
(listing the remedies that the FDCA explicitly authorizes to punish violations of its provi-
sions, and noting that state law damages would be "different from, and in addition to,
these FDCA remedies"); cf. Lyndon, supra note 3, at 139 ("Tort law ... impos[es] on
firms a superfluous and disorganized second layer of legal controls.").
311. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (1994) (granting to the FDA comprehensive jurisdic-
tion over medical devices); cf Papas v. Upjohn, 985 F.2d 516, 518-19 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that under FIFRA, the relevant agency (EPA) is charged with enforcement of
federal labeling restrictions and state court juries cannot usurp that role). Indeed, jury
verdicts might invite the sort of inconsistency and unpredictability that the MDA was
designed to guard against. See Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300,307 (5th Cir. 1995)
("Allowing a jury or court to second-guess the FDA's enforcement of its own regulations
contravenes Congress's expressly stated intent in § 360k(a) to eliminate attempts by
states to impose conflicting requirements on medical device manufacturers."); Mendes, 18
F.3d at 19 & n.4 (finding that MDA does not give juries the right to enforce FDA stan-
dards); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[I]f
experimental procedures are subject to hindsight evaluation by juries ... there will be
fewer experimental treatments, and patients will suffer.").
312. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp. 67 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995)
("Premarket approval is supposed to benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free
from liability, for manufacturers."); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir.
1995) ("Indeed, the most the manufacturer is required to do in its [section] 510k state-
ment is describe the device in a way that establishes that the device 'has the same
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over ninety-five percent of medical devices,313 and the designs of these
devices are not otherwise federally regulated,314 the unanimous
agreement of the Court on this point is highly significant. All of the
current Justices agree that defective design claims are available
against medical devices that bypassed review because they were
"substantially equivalent" to devices that existed before 1976.2"s
Thus, the only difference in outcome between the plurality and
dissenting opinions involved the mismanufacture and failure-to-warn
claims-and only as much of those claims as would impose a duty on
the manufacturer beyond that required under the MDA."6 In the
end, all that was in dispute between the Justices in Medtronic was
whether a small fraction of the Lohrs' many state law claims was pre-
empted.
The plaintiff's bar can be further reassured by the fact that even
technological characteristics' or, if not, that it is 'as safe and effective' as a predicate de-
vice."), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); id at 438 (finding that, because of
the non-preemptive character of the section 510(k) process, "the nexus between the state
and federal requirements is much weaker with respect to design defects than it is with
respect to manufacturing and labeling, and we find this nexus inadequate to justify the
displacement of state law regarding defective design"); Brian J. Donato & Mary Beth
Neraas, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims Involving Drugs and Medical
Devices Regulated Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 305, 312 (1993) (arguing that preemption occurs when "the FDA regulates and ap-
proves a particular aspect of a device" (emphasis added)); id at 315-16 (noting that
premarket clearance does not constitute such approval).
313. See Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 914 n.98.
314. The "substantial equivalency" process exempts devices from further design re-
quirements under the FDCA. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
315. In general, the defective design claim, which can be characterized as either negli-
gence or strict liability, is a key weapon for products liability plaintiffs' attorneys. See 1
MADDEN, supra note 139, § 2.2, at 24-25 ("The three circumstances in which the manu-
facturer is most likely to incur liability are for negligent manufacture, negligent design or
formulation, or ... for providing inadequate warnings . . . ." (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted)); 1 id. § 8.1, at 287-93 (discussing defective design liability in general).
The Court's holding that the section 510(k) process does not preempt common-law
claims also has implications for medical devices that qualify for an Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE). The IDE process permits expedited premarket approval for devices to
be used in humans to collect data. See 21 C.F.R. § 812 (1996). See generally Wolfman &
Zieve, supra note 37, at pt. IV.B. (discussing the IDE process in light of Medtronic).
Since the IDE process, like section 510(k), imposes mainly procedural and not substantive
requirements, the logic that section 510(k) does not preempt state tort claims probably
applies in the IDE context also. See id. But see Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp.
181, 185 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that nothing in Medtronic compels non-preemption of
IDE devices, and contrasting the IDE process with "the [section] 510(k) devices that so
troubled the [Medtronic] Court").
316. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("I also agree that the Lohrs' claims are not pre-empted by § 360k to the extent
that they seek damages for Medtronic's alleged violation of federal requirements.").
317. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the dissenters in Medtronic took a much more moderate stance than
might have been expected. Compared to Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Cipollone, portions of the Medtronic dissent seem almost
plaintiff-friendly.31 For example, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, would have held in Cipollone that all of the plaintiff's claims
were preempted by the applicable statute."9 In contrast, as noted
above, the dissenters in Medtronic would have preserved the most
important of the Lohrs' claims3' through a faithful application of the
Cipollone claim-by-claim inquiry.321
Although they barely surface in the opinions, Medtronic raises
dynamic federalism concerns." These concerns are of particular in-
318. Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 549 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[The plurality's] finding that
[preemption clauses] produce only partial pre-emption of petitioner's common-law claims
rests upon ... misperceptions ... ."), with Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that some of the plaintiffs' claims sur-
vived preemption analysis).
319. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Although Justice Scalia conceded that not all of the plaintiff's claims
were preempted under an earlier statute, see id. at 550 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part), the earlier statute did not use the word
"requirement" and is not comparable to the MDA. For a comparison of the two statutes
at issue in Cipollone, see supra note 224.
320. See supra notes 303-15 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor could have
taken a more extreme approach, and held that all of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted
per se. She probably would have had no trouble bringing Justices Scalia and Thomas
along on this theory, both of whom had argued in Cipollone that the statute in question
preempted all state common-law claims. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (finding complete preemption
under cigarette labeling statute). Given the plethora of lower court decisions finding
complete preemption, this theory would not have been implausible. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding complete preemption under
MDA); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1137 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).
321. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). The Cipollone claim-by-claim inquiry is as follows:
[Courts] must look to each of petitioner's common-law claims to determine
whether it is in fact pre-empted. The central inquiry in each case is straightfor-
ward: we ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law
damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition...' giving that clause a
fair but narrow reading.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24 (footnote omitted) (quoting Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act § 5(b), 79 Stat. 282, 283, as amended by Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act of 1969, § 2(b), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994))).
322. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Edell & Walters, supra note 37, at 604
(arguing that lower court MDA post-Cipollone decisions "represent a form of judicial
activism that, in derogation of constitutional principles, eliminates state remedies");
Massey, supra note 37, at 62 (utilizing Tenth Amendment in argument for narrow con-
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terest because Medtronic inverted the usual ideological alignment of
the Court on federalism issues." The provision of tort remedies to
compensate for personal injuries is considered a traditional state
"police power" function.3 4 Preemption, by definition, involves fed-
eral usurpation of powers that states would otherwise exercise."' As
one group of federal appellate judges has written:
When courts consider whether Congress intended to pre-
empt state laws, ... the nation's commitment to federalism
would seem to argue for an especially clear statement of
congressional intent to oust states from their traditional
struction of preemption statutes). Professor Arthur Miller, arguing before the Supreme
Court on behalf of Medtronic, raised an interesting hypothetical in advocating a limited
role for states and localities under the MDA:
Now, along comes the District of Columbia. It's got a financial crisis. Its city
council decides to enact a statute. It says, anyone who has been found in viola-
tion of the FDA is to pay a fine to the city of $1 million.
Now, surely-surely this Court in many of its opinions has said the preemp-
tion is logical when it interferes with the Federal regime. This Federal regime
was designed to let the FDA determine what the qualifications of a product
should be, when those qualifications are up to snuff, not up to snuff, 518 of the
statute lays out a series of remedies, and to permit any State or municipality to
come along and impose in the name of identity an additional sanction seems to
me completely destructive.
Transcript of Oral Arg., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886), available in 1996 WL
207143, at *15.
323. See infra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
324. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,248 (1984); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption
of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV. 187, 248 (1993) ("[T]he protection
of consumers against injuries from defective products falls squarely within traditional
areas of state responsibility."); Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two
Assumptions About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14:2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv.YALE J.
ON REG. 371, 372 (Joint Symposium Issue, March 1-2, 1996) ("Tort policymaking tradi-
tionally has taken place at the state level. One assumption underlying this distribution of
power is that states are better able than the national government to fashion tort rules
appropriate for local conditions and circumstances."). By analogy, in 1965 one congress-
man who opposed the preemption provision in the cigarette smoking statute at issue in
Cipollone said:
I cannot conceive of any sound reason why the sale and advertising of ciga-
rettes should be granted Federal protection from States and local regulations
which are more stringent than Federal regulations. If the pattern of protection
provided for by this legislation for cigarettes were extended to other products,
neither State nor local authorities would be in a position to impose in the valid
exercise of their policing powers, requirements aimed at protecting the health of
the people in their respective States and communities.
H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 20 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350,2366 (statement
of Sen. Moss).
325. See Tribe, supra note 17, at 790 (stating that the broad view of preemption "has
the burning force of a prairie fire, and it is hard to see what structures of state compensa-
tion would survive the ensuing conflagration").
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legislative functions. For if in close or uncertain cases a
court proceeds to preempt state laws where that result was
not clearly the product of Congress's considered judgment,
the court has eroded the dual system of government that en-
sures our liberties, representation, diversity, and effective
governance.'l
Several recent Supreme Court decisions have evinced a trend to
slant the distribution of powers more in favor of the states.327 If a
federal statute defining boundaries between state and federal power
is ambiguous, it is generally construed in favor of the states.3" Given
the Court's increasing solicitude for state sovereignty, it is surprising
that the Court did not further emphasize the federalism aspect of its
holding.329 It is even more surprising that exactly the same Justices
326. KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE
APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE 40 (1991).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (limiting Congress's
power to legislate in traditionally state-governed areas); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144,188 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot directly "compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991)
(holding that federal employment statute did not apply to state judges).
328. See TRIBE, supra note 115, § 6-25, at 479 ("[T]here does appear to be an overrid-
ing reluctance to infer preemption in ambiguous cases."); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at
460, 461 (justifying the separation of powers principle that "Congress should make its
intention 'clear and manifest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States,"
on the grounds that such an exercise "upset[s] the usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers" (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947))).
329. The Medtronic Court noted that "because the States are independent sovereigns
in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt
state-law causes of action," but quickly moved on to other issues. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at
2250. The federalism issue was argued vigorously by 20 states intervening as amici curiae.
See Brief of the States of Florida, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia as
Amici Curiae in Support of Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-
886). The states raised key points concerning federalism implications in Medtronic:
Amici have a strong interest in this case because they are responsible for the
enforcement of laws safeguarding public health, safety, and welfare. In addition,
amici have a strong interest in preserving the appropriate balance of authority
between the States and the federal government. Through the evolution of their
common law and by legislative enactments, the States have developed and re-
fined their tort systems to balance the needs and rights of victims against the
interest of manufacturers of potentially dangerous or defective products.
Id. at 1; see also Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State
Governments, National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, International
City/County Management Association, and U.S. Conference of Mayors as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr at 29, Med-
tronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) ("It would stand the presumption against preemption on
its head to insist that the States, in the exercise of their historic police powers, must over-
come the inertia of the federal legislative process to secure statutory relief from the court
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who typically defend state sovereignty dissented in Medtronic, voting
in favor of federal preemption." For example, Justice O'Connor's
protest in South Carolina v. Baker331 that "[t]he Court has failed to
enforce the constitutional safeguards of state autonomy and self-
sufficiency that may be found in the Tenth Amendment and the
Guarantee Clause, as well as in the principles of federalism implicit
in the Constitution"332 seems inconsistent with her position in Med-
tronic. One possible explanation is that the idea of state sovereignty,
while embraced in the abstract, is less important to the conservative
wing of the Court when it conflicts with other policy preferences
(such as protection of industry against onerous and contingent liabil-
ity).3' Still, future tort plaintiffs should emphasize federalism as a
of appeals' unduly expansive interpretation of section 360k(a)."); Brief Amicus Curiae of
the State of California in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Mi-
chael Lohr at 3, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886) ("I[T]he Court's ruling here may not
only determine the ongoing validity of state common law tort claims as they apply to
medical devices, it may equally determine the ability of the states to enforce public health
and safety statutes.").
330. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1887 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)
for the proposition that "Congress' inclusion of an express pre-emption clause in a federal
statute implies that state laws beyond the reach of that clause are not pre-empted"); id. at
1887 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 115, § 6-25, at 480, for the
proposition that "courts should hesitate to read federal statutes to pre-empt state law,
because 'to [do so would] give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congres-
sional ambiguity' " and would undermine prior decisions of the Court); CSX Transp., Inc.
v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 679 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("Respect for the presumptive sanctity of state law should be no less when federal
pre-emption occurs by administrative fiat rather than by congressional edict."); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("If state autonomy is ignored in assessing the means by which Congress regulates mat-
ters affecting commerce, then federalism becomes irrelevant simply because the set of
activities remaining beyond the reach of such a commerce power 'may well be negligi-
ble.' "(quoting id& at 545)).
Anomalously, Justices Scalia and Thomas had argued vigorously against the same
language in Cipollone that they cited three years later in U.S. Term Limits as protecting
state sovereignty. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the rule that "[o]nce there is an express pre-
emption provision,... all doctrines of implied pre-emption are eliminated.... works mis-
chief").
331. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
332. Il at 533-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
333. Cf. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,511 (1989) (holding, in an opinion
by Justice O'Connor, that a city affirmative action program for awarding municipal con-
tracts to minority business enterprises violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 36, at 1455 ("Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Croson is striking ... for its considerable tension
with [her] usual commitment to state and local governments.").
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cornerstone of the anti-preemption argument.3'
While the law of preemption in general was in a state of disarray
at the time Medtronic was decided, it is not clear whether Medtronic
effectively patched the "crazy quilt" of Cipollone. On the facts of
Medtronic, the Court had the opportunity to, but did not, adopt a
simple, per se rule that common-law claims are or are not preempted
as different or additional requirements?35 Instead, the Court essen-
tially perpetuated the Cipollone framework for analyzing statutory
tort preemption defenses. 6 The Cipollone Court said that "[t]he
central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask whether the
334. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) ("Admittedly, some of
our prior cases have ... giv[en] great deference to congressional action .... but we decline
here to proceed any further. To do so would ... [eliminate any] distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local." (citations omitted)); TRIBE, supra note 115, § 6-
25, at 479 (discussing the intrusion that preemption works on state autonomy); Eaton &
Talarico, supra note 324, at 385 (questioning the argument that a "national tort law" is
needed because otherwise states will engage in a pro-plaintiff "race to the bottom" that
benefits local plaintiffs at the expense of business); Edell & Waters, supra note 37, at 604
(noting the federalism implications of preemption of tort claims). See generally Ronald J.
Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 771, 783-87 (1996) (discussing the
importance of federalism for the Rehnquist Court); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federal-
ism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1491 (1995) (discussing possible future directions of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence); Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Importance
of Federalism, Introduction to Symposium, Constructing a New Federalism Jurisdictional
Competence and Competition, 14:2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv./ YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2-3 (Joint
Symposium Issue, March 1-2, 1996) (noting current significance of federalism issue).
335. The Court held that the state common-law duties to use due care and to warn
consumers "escape[d] preemption, not because the source of the duty is a judge-made
common-law rule," but rather because they were outside the scope of § 360k(a) on Med-
tronic's particular facts. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258 (emphasis added). At first glance,
Medtronic might give the impression that common-law claims generally are not displaced
by federal statutes that expressly preempt state "requirements." See id. (concluding that
none of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted). For example, the Court said in dictum
that "if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a singu-
larly odd word with which to do it." Id. at 2251. However, the Court declined to hold
that the MDA never could preempt a state tort claim. See id. at 2258-59; see also supra
notes 279-301 (explaining that Medtronic did not overrule Cipollone).
336. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (citing Cipollone extensively). One case
decided in the wake of Medtronic shows that lower courts still feel obliged to conduct the
claim-by-claim "crazy quilt" analysis enunciated by Cipollone. See Sanders v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 92 F.3d 1181 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), available in
No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 423124 (4th Cir. July 30, 1996). Although the Sanders court was
comfortable with a blanket rule that claims alleging noncompliance with federal standards
are not preempted, it said that with regard to "these other claims--of strict liability, neg-
ligence, lack of informed consent, and breach of warranty-alleg[ing] something other
than noncompliance with federal standards, [Medtronic] suggests a case-specific assess-
ment of the claims and of any applicable federal requirements." Id. at *2. Consequently,
the court remanded the case because "[t]his sort of analysis should be undertaken by the
district court in the first instance, guided by the [Medtronic] decision." Il
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legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action
constitutes a 'requirement [under the language of the statute],' giving
that clause a fair but narrow reading."337 Rather than replacing the
Cipollone test, Medtronic retained the test, but shifted the presump-
tion against preemption-at least insofar as the MDA is concerned.3
The Court could have taken the position of Justice Blackmun in
Cipollone that a common-law claim for damages is never subject to
preemption,339 but it declined to adopt this straightforward ap-
proach?1
Medtronic's impact on the future of the statutory tort preemp-
tion doctrine can be understood in two dimensions. First, on a
precise level, it shows how the Court will interpret the preemption
provisions of the MDA. Much was at stake in Medtronic." For ex-
337. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523-24 (1992) (quoting Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 2(b), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) (1994))).
338. See Noah, supra note 37, at S-37. Perhaps the "one step forward, two steps back"
approach of the Medtronic plurality results from the fact that it was a close compromise-
deliberately ambiguous in order to garner five votes. See iL at S-38 ("Stevens thought...
[no tort claims would ever be preempted under the MDA], but he failed to get a majority
to accept this position.").
339. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
340. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258-59. There is no suggestion in the Medtronic
plurality opinion that Cipollone was wrongly decided. Even the two Justices remaining on
the Court who had dissented in Cipollone (Kennedy and Souter) acquiesced in an opinion
that accepted Cipollone's basic premises. See id. at 2250 (citing Cipollone extensively for
support).
The Medtronic dissenters saw it as internally inconsistent for the plurality to reject
the theoretical underpinnings of the MDA preemption defense, while simultaneously
conceding that the MDA might preempt some claims:
[T]he plurality essentially makes the case that the statute's language, purpose,
and legislative history, as well as the consequences of a different interpretation,
indicate that Congress did not intend "requirement" to include state common-
law claims at all. The principal opinion proceeds to disclaim this position, how-
ever, in Parts V and VI and concludes, rather, that a state common-law action
might constitute a requirement ....
Id. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
341. See Richard C. Reuben, The Heart of the Matter, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 44, 44
(discussing importance of Medtronic prior to Court's decision). The importance of the
case to a wide variety of interest groups is evidenced by the fact that seventeen amicus
briefs were filed in Medtronic. See Amicus Curiae Brief of The Association of Trial Law-
yers of America in Support of the Cross-Petitioners, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886);
Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Retired Persons, Consumers Union, Con-
sumer Federation of America, National Women's Health Network, Command Trust
Network and Valv in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael
Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief Amici Curiae for the Center for Patient
Advocacy and the California Health Care Institute in Support of Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of
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ample, Medtronic has defended against dozens of nearly identical
products liability lawsuits in different jurisdictions involving allegedly
defective pacemakers. 2 The medical products industry has unsuc-
cessfully lobbied Congress for legislation that would directly
immunize manufacturers who complied with federal standards from
products liability lawsuits.34' The holding of Medtronic clearly means
that most plaintiffs' claims will not be preempted by the MDA.'
California in Support of Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr,
Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief Amicus Curiae of Trial Lawyers For Public
Justice, P.C., in Support of Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-
886); Brief for Amicus Curiae, Plaintiffs' Legal Committee in MDL Docket No. 1014, in
Support of Cross-Petitioners, Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886); Brief For the Medical Device Manufacturers Association as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-
886); Brief for Two Products Liability Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Nei-
ther Party, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents/Cross-Petitioners, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886);
Brief of the American Insurance Association, the American Tort Reform Association,
and the National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of Amicus Curiae Collagen Corporation in
Support of Petitioner and Cross-Respondent Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886); Brief of Amicus Curiae General Motors Corporation in Support of Petitioner,
Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of the Health Industry Manufacturers Associa-
tion and Medmarc Insurance Company as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent, Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of the National
Conference of State Legislatures, Council of State Governments, National Association of
Counties, National League of Cities, International City/County Management Association,
and U.S. Conference Of Mayors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents/Cross-
Petitioners Lora Lohr and Michael Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of the
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner Med-
tronic, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of the States of Florida, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Lora Lohr and Mi-
chael Lohr, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and 95-886); Brief of Washington Legal Foundation
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, Medtronic (Nos. 95-754 and
95-886).
342. Since the early 1970s, Medtronic, Inc. has been a defendant in at least 34 reported
cases brought over allegedly defective pacemakers. Search of Westlaw, ALLCASES
Database (Dec. 29, 1996) (search for cases containing "MEDTRONIC" in TITLE field,
and "INJUR!" and "PACEMAKER" but not "PATENT").
343. See Reuben, supra note 341, at 44. The medical products industry's push to con-
trol liability is part of a broader Republican-based trend to implement "major overhauls
in the tort system." See id.; see also Eaton & Talarico, supra note 324, at 371-72
(discussing tort reform as a hallmark of the "Republican Revolution"); Michael L. Rus-
tad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers,
and Consumers, 48 RUTGERs L. REv. 673, 673-78 (1996) (describing recent tort reform
legislation efforts); Stephen D. Sugarman, Should Congress Engage in Tort Reform?, 1
MICH. L. & POL'Y REv. 121, 136-39 (1996) (summarizing the thrust of Republican tort
reform initiatives).
344. The holding is fairly solid, despite the plurality's use of narrow language-even
within the context of the MDA-to minimize the precedential value of Medtronic. See,
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Until Medtronic, the preemption defense carried many defendants'
summary judgment motions in the federal district courts."5 Inasmuch
as most plaintiffs' claims over defective medical devices are similar to
the Lohrs', manufacturers will now be forced to change their litiga-
tion strategies or to settle.'
e.g., Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (reserving the question of preemption of future cases
under MDA). The Lohrs' claims were fairly typical of the claims of most plaintiffs in
defective medical device litigation. See generally 2 MADDEN, supra note 139, §§ 24.1 to
.9, at 389-413, 131-35 supp. (listing common theories of liability in medical device cases).
As Justice Stevens conceded, "[i]t will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law
cause of action to issue a decree that has 'the effect of establishing a substantive require-
ment for a specific device.'" Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d)(6) (1996)).
On July 1, 1996, several days after the Medtronic decision, the Court reinforced its
holding by vacating a number of lower court decisions holding that plaintiffs' claims were
preempted by the MDA, and remanding them for reconsideration in light of Medtronic.
See Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), vacating 65 F.3d 392 (4th
Cir. 1995); English v. Mentor Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), vacating 67 F.3d 477 (3d Cir.
1995); Mentor Corp. v. Feldt, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), vacating 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995);
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996), vacating 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995);
Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996), vacating 70 F.3d 39 (6th
Cir. 1995); Mentor Corp. v. Bingham, 116 S. Ct. 2577 (1996), vacating 77 F.3d 478 (5th
Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
345. See, e.g., Easterling v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-3832, 1995 WL
766340, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 1995) (granting summary judgment to defendant on pre-
emption defense); Goldsmith v. Mentor Corp., 913 F. Supp. 56,63 (D.N.H. 1995) (holding
that all of the plaintiff's claims over a testicular prosthesis were preempted); Blanchard v.
Collagen Corp., 909 F. Supp. 427, 437 (E.D. La. 1995) (granting summary judgment to
defendant on all claims over collagen injections except those based on contamination of
product); Mastrangelo v. Howmedica, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 439, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(granting summary judgment, based on preemption defense, to defendant in suit over
artificial knee joint); Chadwell v. Optical Radiation Corp., 902 F. Supp. 830, 836 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) (granting summary judgment to defendant in suit over eye gel on the grounds
that all of the plaintiff's claims were preempted); Petix v. Kabi Pharmacia Ophthalmics,
Inc., 884 F. Supp. 92, 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment on preemption grounds in action involving intraocular eye lens).
346. Indeed, the effect of Medtronic has already been felt. Just weeks after Medtronic,
the Fourth Circuit remanded an intraocular lens products liability case for reconsideration
"[b]ased on the Court's ruling in [Medtronic]." Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., 92
F.3d 1181 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), available in No. 95-1967, 1996 WL
423124, at *1 (4th Cir. July 30, 1996); see also, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co.,
Nos. 94-1520 and 96-1358, 1996 WL 725818, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996) ("In light of the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, we hold that § 360k(a)
does not preempt Duvall's claims." (citation omitted)); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 95 F.3d 4, 4
(5th Cir. 1996) (vacating district court's granting of summary judgment to defendant on
preemption grounds); Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 770-73
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that in light of Medtronic, the plaintiff's claims of negli-
gence, strict liability, and breach of warranty over an intraocular fluid were not
preempted, even though the fluid had undergone full premarket approval and not merely
the section 510(k) process); Kernats v. Smith Indus. Med. Sys., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 1300,
1308-11 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding, after conducting thorough Medtronic analysis, that the
MDA did not preempt claims over a defective catheter, even though the catheter had
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Second, on a broader and more uncertain level, Medtronic also
exposes some trends on the Court relating to federal preemption of
products liability generally.37 Obviously, plaintiffs' lawyers would
like to extrapolate Medtronic to the entire array of products liability
areas where the preemption defense is commonly invoked by defen-
dants.38 Many of the statutes establishing preemption use the word
"requirement." 39  No longer is there a Cipollone presumption that
"requirement" includes common-law tort actions.50
undergone full premarket review), appeal denied, 169 Ill. 2d 569 (1996) (unreported table
decision); Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 927 S.W.2d 848, 855 (Mo. 1996) ("Under both the plu-
rality opinion of Justice Stevens and the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, none of the
plaintiffs' claims [over intraocular lens implants] are preempted."); Romano v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 659 N.Y.S.2d 544, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) ("In light of the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, it is clear that the plaintiffs'
claims ... are not preempted by Federal law ... ." (citation omitted)). But see, e.g.,
Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 117 (Pa. 1996) (holding, in suit over collagen injections,
that even after Medtronic, claims for negligent development of product, failure to warn,
and inadequate labeling were preempted because such suits "attempt to substitute a rea-
sonableness analysis characteristic of negligence claims for the judgment of the FDA").
347. By analogy, although Cipollone involved a specific statute, the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, its holding influenced lower courts' interpretations of a
wide variety of statutes containing similar preemption language. See supra notes 257-60
and accompanying text.
348. For example, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act provides:
[I]f ... a requirement is established to protect against a risk of illness or injury
associated with a hazardous substance, no State or political subdivision of a State
may establish or continue in effect a requirement applicable to such substance
and designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury unless such re-
quirement is identical to the requirement established under such regulations.
15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (1994) (Effect Upon Federal and State Law); see Wolfman &
Zieve, supra note 37, pt. V (predicting that Medtronic will help plaintiffs to stave off pre-
emption defenses in FHSA and FIFRA cases).
The post-Medtronic cases have already borne out Wolfman and Zieve's prediction.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 554-55 (1st Cir. 1996)
(holding that Medtronic precluded preemption of tort claims by the Flammable Fabrics
Act, because "the two statutes are so close in structure that they should be read in the
same fashion"); Ketchum v. Hyundai Motor Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595, 598 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) ("[T]he statutory scheme in Medtronic differs significantly from the [National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle] Safety Act, and the [Court was widely divided in its interpretation
of the preemption language in the MDA. Nevertheless, we find guidance in the [Court's
discussion of the basic principles of preemption."); id. at 599 (holding that the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not preempt common-law tort claims against
Hyundai over a failed passenger restraint system). But see, e.g., Lewis v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 682 A.2d 724, 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding, after
distinguishing FIFRA from the MDA, that the ruling "that plaintiff's claims based on
inadequate labeling are preempted by FIFRA remains an accurate statement of the appli-
cable law" even after Medtronic).
349. See supra note 13 (citing some other statutes with preemption provisions).
350. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 ("[I]f Congress intended to preclude all com-
mon-law causes of action, it chose a singularly odd word ["requirement"] with which to do
it.").
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However, the argument that the Medtronic reasoning should be
extended to these other statutes may ultimately be self-defeating, be-
cause the plurality's statement that "few, if any, common-law duties
have been preempted by this statute ' was based specifically on the
legislative and regulatory context of the MDA."2 The Medtronic plu-
rality did not disturb Cipollone's conclusion that "requirement" had
an opposite meaning in a different statute.353 Since every statute is
unique, it will be incumbent on courts determining the scope of fed-
eral preemption to analyze the word "requirement" de novo in the
context of the particular statute at issue. '
Despite these limitations, courts in the past have not hesitated to
cite preemption cases involving different statutes as authoritative.
For example, when the Eleventh Circuit considered Medtronic, it re-
lied on precedent involving preemption under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act."5 Thus, Medtronic will
inevitably have some reverberations beyond the specific context of
the MDA. If nothing else, it shows that preemption is not a foregone
conclusion. Rather, courts performing the Cipollone analysis will
have to be amenable to the possibility that more plaintiffs' claims will
survive than previously assumed.
351. Id. at 2259.
352. See id. at 2252. The Court declined even to lay down a blanket rule that would
bind only the MDA. See id. at 2259; see also supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's effort to narrow its holding). A fortiori, it would seem all the more
unlikely that the Court meant for its holding of non-preemption to be applied widely out-
side the context of the MDA. See Noah, supra note 308, at 905 (arguing that the
preemption issue "defies simple unitary treatment" because every statute is unique).
353. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251 ("[A]lthough we have on prior occasions con-
cluded that a statute pre-empting certain state 'requirements' could also pre-empt
common-law damages claims, that statute did not sweep nearly as broadly as Medtronic
would have us believe that this statute does." (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992))). See generally Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 918
("Although it would make life simpler if Congress used words consistently from statute to
statute, it does not.").
354. Cf Adler & Mann, supra note 108, at 918 ("[A]ssuming arguendo that Congress
used the terms 'requirements' and 'prohibitions' to preempt state tort actions in the 1969
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, that does not mean every time one or both of these
terms occurs in federal law that state tort law is preempted."). For a list of recent cases in
which courts have applied Medtronic to other statutes, see supra note 348.
355. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). That precedent, Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516,
518-19 (11th Cir. 1993), held that common-law tort claims alleging violations of the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act's (FIFRA's) own labeling standards
were preempted. The Eleventh Circuit in Medtronic said: "We believe Papas controls
here and hold that preemption under the MDA cannot be defeated by a common-law suit
alleging a violation of the statutory standards." Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335,
1343 (11th Cir. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
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However, even after the Medtronic decision, a real possibility
remains that a pro-preemption majority on the Court could evolve.356
For Justice Breyer, who was the "swing vote" in Medtronic, the
FDA's express disclaimer of preemption by "general" requirements
was the touchstone."7 However, Justice Breyer clearly believed that
the statute itself authorized preemption.35 Most notably, Justice
Breyer agreed with the dissenters that the word "requirement" in the
statute definitely encompassed duties arising out of state tort law.359
If, in the next case presenting the Court with a preemption issue, the
applicable federal agency advocated preemption more zealously than
did the FDA, Justice Breyer might vote with the Medtronic dissenters
to form a new pro-preemption majority.
Federal preemption will not disappear in the post-Medtronic
world of products liability. But until a case arises causing members
of the Court to realign their positions on preemption issues, Med-
tronic is likely to stem the tide-originally induced by Cipollone-of
summary judgments for defendants on preemption grounds.3 "0 De-
fendants can no longer take the preemption defense for granted.
356. Plaintiffs arguing against preemption should be responsive to the concerns of the
dissenters in Medtronic. For example, the dissenters agreed with the plurality that claims
alleging violations of federal standards were not preempted. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at
2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Plaintiffs who seek to rely
on the manufacturer's violation of federal standards should definitely make that allega-
tion explicit. See Wolfnan & Zieve, supra note 37, pt. W.E. ("[N]o one should risk being
bounced from court for failing to plead the case properly. Therefore, to be safe, and as-
suming one has the facts, the complaint should allege that the defendant violated state
law (e.g., was negligent or the like) for failing to abide by FDCA standards."); see also
Noah, supra note 308, at 939 n.153 ("[T]he courts' precise resolution of [whether claims
based on violations of federal standards are preempted] is unclear because the plaintiffs
in many of these cases never alleged a failure to comply with agency requirements."); cf.
English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477,481 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding, before Medtronic, that
claims alleging violation of federal standards might escape preemption, but dismissing the
case because the plaintiff did not mention the federal standards in the pleadings), vacated
and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
357. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Justice Breyer's opinion focused heavily on the deference owed to ad-
ministrative agencies' interpretation of preemption. See iL (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
358. See id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Noah, supra note 37, at S-38 ("Five members of the current Court (namely, those concur-
ring and dissenting in Medtronic) remain satisfied with the Cipollone analysis,
notwithstanding Breyer's decision to side with Stevens, et al., on the particular facts of
this case.").
359. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
360. See supra note 345 (listing some pre-Medtronic cases in which federal district
courts granted summary judgment for the defendant based on preemption grounds).
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Someday, Congress may amend statutes such as the MDA to clarify
their preemptive intent,"' or agencies such as the FDA may adopt
more aggressive interpretations of statutory preemption clauses. In
the meantime, courts weaving through the "crazy quilt" of preemp-
tion of state tort law will have to appreciate the fresh new hues that
Medtronic has stitched into the embroidery.
ROBERT J. KATERBERG
361. Cf Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4401-08 (1994). While this Act expressly preempts state imposition of a "statement
relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health," id § 4406(b), it expressly
preserves common-law tort actions against manufacturers of those products, see Id.
§ 4406(c). See generally Benz & Meyer, supra note 222, at 499 ("Congress and other rule-
making federal agencies must be persuaded, through lobbying efforts or otherwise, of the
necessity of drafting preemptive legislation with the utmost clarity to ensure that their
intent is not frustrated by the courts.").
1500 [Vol. 75
